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Globoecopragmatism: How to Think (and How 
Not to Think) About Trade and the Environment 
Robert F. Blomquist∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization—for better or for worse—is the great political-
economic-legal issue of the first part of the twenty-first century.  
Thoughtful commentators in recent years have started to respond to the 
strident critics of globalization who tend to blame expanded international 
trade and direct foreign investment for a host of social ills—from 
American job losses and a race to the bottom in wages to attacks on 
environmental laws to compromised health standards. 
The principal thesis of this Article is that globalization is not as bad 
for the environment as its critics contend and, in many ways, is good for 
the environment in the long term.  Yet, there are pragmatic steps that the 
international community can take to more intelligently ameliorate trade-
induced environmental degradation and to better balance free trade with 
ecological protection. 
Make no mistake, this Article has attitude.  I do not pretend to have 
selected an objective, scientific sample of writings on trade and the 
environment.  Rather, I have chosen material which I find to be 
interesting.  My objective is to take apart the work of six recently 
published pieces on trade and the environment and then to synthesize the 
most robust insights contained in these publications into various 
pragmatic principles that will provoke a debate among scholars and 
policymakers on a global, practical, trade-enhancing, environmentally 
protective legal strategy for the future.  My name for this overarching 
framework for thinking clearly and wisely about trade and environmental 
issues also has attitude: with an eye toward the elegant and an ear toward 
the rhythmic, I suggest the name globoecopragmatism.  In the course of 
my discussion, as I deem it useful, and helpful, I will employ the views 
of other scholars. 
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The three-part structure of the remainder of this Article is as follows.  
First, in Part II, I will summarize and discuss some key recent literature 
of environmental critics of globalization.1  Second, in Part III, I will 
review and analyze some major up-to-date defenses by globalization 
optimists to the environmental critics.2  Finally, in Part IV, synthesizing 
the edifying views of both globalization critics and globalization 
optimists, while building on the work of other theorists, I sketch the 
elements of a practical, trade-enhancing, environmentally protective 
legal strategy that I call globoecopragmatism; this discussion includes 
“the Blomquist Funnel of Pragmatism on Global Trade and the 
Environment,” which incorporates seventeen principles of 
globoecopragmatism—ranging from the most concrete considerations to 
the most abstract inquiries.3 
II.  ENVIRONMENTAL CRITICS OF GLOBALIZATION 
A. Peter Singer’s Ethical Jeremiad 
In his provocative book, One World,4 Princeton bioethicist Peter 
Singer puts forth a call for “a larger perspective than that of national self-
interest”5 in living life in the new century—what he encapsulates with his 
call for “an ethical perspective on globalization.”6 
Singer starts his book with a startling linkage between 9/11 and 
emissions of carbon dioxide from automobiles: 
                                                     
 1. See infra notes 4–102 and accompanying text (discussing recent literature of environmental 
critics of globalization). 
 2. See infra notes 103–261 and accompanying text (analyzing defenses by globalization 
optimists to the environmental critics). 
 3. See infra notes 262–318 and accompanying text (giving principles of globoecopragmatism).  
In the last few years there has been an explosion of books on globalization, trade, and the 
environment.  This corpus of writings should be analyzed and synthesized into the 
globoecopragmatism framework discussed in this Article.  I have these books neatly stacked in an 
empty Guinness Extra Stout box in my office—to be read, studied, and incorporated into my work-
in-progress globoecopragmatism model in the future.  See generally NATHALIE BERNASCONI-
OSTERWALDER ET AL., ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A GUIDE TO WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2005); 
SCOTT C. BRADFORD & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE FAR ENOUGH?: THE 
COSTS OF FRAGMENTED MARKETS (2004); I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS (4th ed. 
2005); FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: U.S. STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004); 
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA’S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE (Carolyn L. Deere & 
Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE (2d ed. 2005); PHILIPPE 
LEGRAIN, OPEN WORLD: THE TRUTH ABOUT GLOBALIZATION (2004); MARTIN WOLF, WHY 
GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2004). 
 4. PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION (2d ed. 2004). 
 5. Id. at ix. 
 6. Id. 
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 Consider two aspects of globalization: first, planes exploding as 
they slam into the World Trade Center, and second, the emission of 
carbon dioxide from the exhausts of gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles.  
One brought instant death and left unforgettable images that were 
watched on television screens all over the world; the other makes a 
contribution to climate change that can be detected only by scientific 
instruments.  Yet both are indications of the way in which we are now 
one world, and the more subtle changes to which sport utility vehicles 
owners unintentionally contribute will almost certainly kill far more 
people than the highly visible one.  When people in rich nations switch 
to vehicles that use more fuel than the cars they used to drive, they 
contribute to changes in the climate of Mozambique or Bangladesh—
changes that may cause crops to fail, sea levels to rise, and tropical 
diseases to spread.  As scientists pile up the evidence that continuing 
greenhouse gas emissions will imperil millions of lives, the leader of 
the nation that emits the largest share of these gases [(President George 
W. Bush)] has said: “We will not do anything that harms our economy, 
because first things first are the people who live in America.”7 
A striking characteristic of Singer’s opening salvo, quoted above, is 
its lack of reference to critical fairness concepts that every lawyer is 
familiar with: causation-in-fact and proximate causation.  Underlying 
these causation concepts are social policies of fault and proportionality 
that the common law has been concerned with down through the 
centuries.  Thus, regarding causation-in-fact, Singer ignores four specific 
problems.  First, he blows off the question of “scientific connection” 
between “the defendant’s acts and the plaintiff’s injury, frequently a 
problem in toxic tort cases.”8  His presupposition seems to suggest that as 
long as there is any theoretical scientific linkage between cause and 
effect (carbon emissions from SUVs in America and increased global 
warming leading to crop failures, sea level rises, or tropical diseases in 
Mozambique or Bangladesh) the “contribution” to the cause—however 
de minimis or attenuated—is blameworthy.9  Second, Singer ignores the 
“who is the cause” problem10 in his archetypal hypothetical.  This type of 
factual causation “problem occurs when the plaintiff is definitely injured 
by someone or something but cannot produce evidence to indicate which 
person among many was the injurer.”11  Third, Singer overlooks in the 
                                                     
 7. Id. at 1–2. 
 8. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 405 (2000). 
 9. Cf. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of 
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (1997) (arguing that because of the practical 
difficulties of producing acceptable evidence in complex, toxic tort cases, as a matter of policy some 
relief from the evidentiary burdens should be allowed in special cases). 
 10. DOBBS, supra note 8, at 406. 
 11. Id. 
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aforementioned excerpt the “would safe behavior have avoided injury” 
problem.12  This cause-in-fact variation “cannot be resolved by medical 
or scientific evidence or by proving which among several defendants was 
the author of the plaintiff’s harm.”13  As explained in a recent treatise on 
tort law: 
Suppose the defendant does not check his rear view mirror before 
backing up and in consequence he backs over a child squatting behind 
the car.  The defendant is negligent—he should have checked the 
mirror—but the critical point for a cause in fact argument is that he 
would not have avoided the injury by checking the mirror, since that 
would not have revealed the squatting child.  Courts say in this kind of 
case that the defendant’s negligence was not a cause in fact of the harm 
and that he is not liable.14 
So Singer fails to consider the would safe behavior have avoided 
injury problem by not discussing practical estimates about whether the 
substantial carbon emissions from coal-fired electrical generators in 
China, India, and Russia would have led to the same tropical diseases, 
flooding, and crop failure in Bangladesh and Mozambique—regardless 
of the American SUV emissions.  Fourth, Singer turns a blind eye to the 
“what harm was caused” problem.15  Indeed, “[i]n some instances it is 
appropriate to apportion harm to causes, that is, to hold a defendant liable 
for a portion of the plaintiff’s harm but not all of it.”16  This “is most 
obviously the case when one defendant breaks the plaintiff’s arm and 
another defendant, acting independently, breaks the plaintiff’s leg.  
Apportionment problems turn both on proof of facts—who caused 
what?—and also on several kinds of legal policy.”17 
Singer, likewise, turns his back on fundamental conceptions of 
proximate causation.  First, he leaves out “practical concerns” in his 
opening metaphor of the problems of globalization associated with 
American SUV carbon emissions.  “Without a proximate cause limit, 
liability . . . would go on forever, one harm leading endlessly to 
others.”18  Alas, without practical proximate cause stopping points, we 
can imagine the following scary scenario: “The negligently made 
vacuum requires a trip to the repair shop, which leads the user to an auto 
                                                     
 12. Id. at 407. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 445. 
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accident, which leads to medical attention, which leads to another injury, 
which leads to loss of a job, and so on, more or less without end.”19 
Singer’s main environmental criticism of globalization is contained 
in a chapter entitled “One Atmosphere.”20  He describes “[t]he 
[p]roblem” of atmospheric pollution as the archetypal illustration “of the 
need for human beings to act globally.”21  According to his view, 
“[g]etting rid of CFCs [chlorofluorocarbons] has turned out to be just the 
curtain raiser” of the world environmental drama; “the main event is 
climate change, or global warming.”22  Singer acknowledges “the 
pioneering achievement of those who brought about the Montreal 
Protocol,” phasing out industrial production of CFCs that were 
scientifically shown to threaten the stratospheric ozone shield.  He 
claims, however, that this achievement of international diplomacy “was 
not so difficult” to bring about since “CFCs can be replaced in all their 
uses at relatively little cost, and the solution to the problem is simply to 
stop producing them.”23  As he opines: “Climate change is a very 
different matter.”24  After citing recent studies that show a risk of 
moderate heat rises over the next century, attributable to human actions, 
Singer tries to take another leap across the chasm of causation with the 
following normative conclusion: 
All of this forces us to think differently about our ethics.  Our value 
system evolved in circumstances in which the atmosphere, like the 
oceans, seemed an unlimited resource, and responsibilities and harms 
were generally clear and well defined.  If someone hit someone else, it 
was clear who had done what.  Now the twin problems of the ozone 
hole and of climate change have revealed bizarre new ways of killing 
people.  By spraying deodorant at your armpit in your New York 
apartment, you could, if you use an aerosol spray propelled by CFCs, 
be contributing to the skin cancer deaths, many years later, of people 
living in . . . Chile.  By driving your car, you could be releasing carbon 
dioxide that is part of a causal chain leading to lethal floods in 
Bangladesh.  How can we adjust our ethics to take account of this new 
situation?25 
What Singer’s analysis lacks is nuance and proportionality.  Indeed, 
underlying his entire ethical scrutiny of the United States’s unwillingness 
                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. SINGER, supra note 4, at 14–50. 
 21. Id. at 14. 
 22. Id. at 15. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 19–20 (endnote omitted). 
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to join the Kyoto Protocol to reduce carbon emissions by multinational 
treaty is a faulty presupposition: that causation of, and responsibility for, 
discrete incidents of flooding, tropical diseases, crop destruction, and the 
like are clearly and directly related to American carbon emissions which 
exceed its per capita “fair share” of sustainable carbon emissions.26  But 
what of the comparative fault of vulnerable nation-states to take prudent 
measures to adjust to gradual increases in global temperatures by such 
measures as encouraging certain crop substitutions, guiding development 
away from coastal areas, and launching preventative health measures 
such as vaccinations and public health improvements?  What of the net 
benefits that so-called climate-damaged nations receive from services 
provided by developed nations with high per capita carbon emissions—
services such as foreign aid, direct foreign investment, innovative 
breakthroughs in life-saving and enhancing drugs, invention of pest-
resistant crops, and maintenance of international security and human 
rights? 
Professor Singer is at his best in his book when he talks about 
emissions trading as a means to accomplish efficient global carbon 
reductions.27  Singer is right to commend the general efficiency of the 
emissions trading mechanism which “works,” as he says, “on the same 
simple economic principle of trade in general: if you can buy something 
from someone else more cheaply than you can produce it yourself, you 
are better off buying it than making it.”28  So far, so good.  But Singer 
proceeds by jumping to the conclusion that the initial allocation of 
                                                     
 26. See id. at 26–44 (discussing how to equitably distribute responsibility to reduce emissions).  
Professor Doug Kysar notes the following quibble with my critique of Singer: 
I view Singer’s book as making a series of arguments about which nations should bear 
the cost of such [environmental] adaptation measures—in other words, I view Singer as 
asking a question that is analytically prior to the assertion of comparative fault that you 
raise.  How do we determine that low-lying Pacific island nations are comparatively 
negligent for failing to build levees, or [to] evacuate if we haven’t resolved whether they 
are under a duty to mitigate damages in that fashion?  Of course damages should be 
mitigated, but that’s an efficiency point.  The harder question is who should bear the 
costs, and that’s a question of equity between nation-states and between generations of 
humans.  We barely even have a language and a normative framework for debating those 
moral issues, let alone consensus agreement on specific rights and duties.  Thus, to assert 
that developing nations are comparatively at fault requires a much more elaborate moral 
and political philosophical argument—precisely the kind of argumentation that Singer is 
offering, but with a much different conclusion. 
E-mail from Douglas Kysar, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, to Robert F. Blomquist, 
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law (Jan. 11, 2006, 18:23 CST) (on file with 
author). 
 27. See SINGER, supra note 4, at 46–49 (discussing the benefits of and objections to emissions 
trading). 
 28. Id. at 46. 
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greenhouse gas emissions should be based on “an equal per capita 
share.”29  This goes beyond economic efficiency and, without asserting 
as much, advocates a massive current redistribution of global wealth 
from the industrial developed nations, like the United States and the 
European Union, to rapidly developing countries with huge populations 
like India and China.  Moreover, Singer’s radical proposal would likely 
hinder economic growth in developed countries because of the 
considerable expense of industries in developed nations having to buy 
emission credits from developing countries.  Singer’s radical greenhouse 
emission trading proposal, then, is an example of what Bjørn Lomborg 
describes as a masked prescription to “fundamentally change the fabric 
of society” by failing to make explicit what the ulterior motive—beyond 
stabilization of global warming—happens to be.30 
Singer buys into the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and its call for “development, equity, sustainability, and 
sustainable development” along with climate policy.31  As Lomborg has 
convincingly demonstrated in his economic analysis of global warming: 
[I]f we want to leave a planet with the most possibilities for our 
descendants, in both the developing and the developed world, it is 
imperative that we focus primarily on the economy and solving our 
problems in a global context rather than focusing—in the IPCC lingo—
on the environment in a regionalized context.  Basically, this puts the 
spotlight on securing economic growth, especially in the third world, 
while ensuring a global economy, both tasks which the world has set 
itself within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
If we succeed here, we could increase world income with $107–274 
trillion, whereas even if we achieve the absolutely most efficient global 
warming policies, we can increase wealth with just $0.245 trillion . . . .  
To put it squarely, what matters to our and our children’s future is not 
primarily decided within the IPCC framework [of global emission 
reductions and trading] but within the WTO framework.32 
                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. BJØRN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF 
THE WORLD 321 (Hugh Matthews trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1998).  Lomborg has 
generated considerable controversy with this work.  For various critiques and endorsements of 
Lomborg’s book, see generally Symposium on Bjørn Lomborg’s The Skeptical Environmentalist, 53 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 249 (2002). 
 31. LOMBORG, supra note 30, at 320 (internal quotation omitted). 
 32. Id. at 324 (emphasis added).  Lomborg also undercuts Singer’s proposal for a national equal 
per capita emissions entitlement followed by trade of these emissions.  According to Lomborg, the 
economically optimal benefit scenario for addressing global warming requires a global trading 
regime—with all nations able to trade—including “limits on the developing world emissions (if only 
at their business-as-usual level),” not, as Singer suggests, allowing high-population developing 
countries to have vastly increased allowances for greenhouse emissions.  Id. at 311. 
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In a separate chapter of his book, One World, Professor Singer 
attacks the WTO on four grounds: 
 
 1. The WTO places economic considerations ahead of concerns 
for the environment, animal welfare, and even human rights. 
 2. The WTO erodes national sovereignty. 
 3. The WTO is undemocratic. 
 4. The WTO increases inequality; or (a stronger charge) it makes 
the rich richer and leaves the world’s poorest people even 
worse off than they would otherwise have been.33 
 
Singer’s first ground of attack on the WTO is a claim that, in its 
jurisprudence, economics trumps all other values.  In justifying this 
assertion, he questions the value of the WTO’s process/product 
distinction (“a country cannot ban a product on the basis of the process 
by which the product was made but only by showing that the banned 
product is different in its inherent nature from other products”34), and 
also argues that General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 
XX is skewed by WTO arbitral rulings that undermine national laws to 
protect the environment by weighting the prohibition against “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries” too heavily.35  
Singer’s process/product critique is bolstered by a penetrating recent 
Harvard Law Review article by Professor Douglas A. Kysar.36  Kysar 
persuasively argues that “many consumers have come to view 
themselves as purchasing with their disposable dollars not only products, 
but also shares of responsibility in the moral and ecological economy 
that produces them”37 and that the process/product distinction “exist[s] 
uncomfortably within a global political climate that increasingly 
                                                                                                                                  
 Lomborg’s essential economic analysis and critique of too abrupt a change toward lower 
emissions of greenhouse gases was born out of his Copenhagen Consensus project which asked eight 
of the world’s leading economists to rank opportunities for solving the world’s most vexing 
problems.  See GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 605–07 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2004) (describing 
the project and giving the expert panel’s ranking of the proposals).  Singer-like proposals, according 
to the Copenhagen Consensus, yield too little global economic benefit at too much cost.  See id. at 
607 (noting that some members of the panel found a “proposal for non-reciprocal lowering of rich-
country tariffs on exports from the least developed countries” would harm nonparticipating poor 
countries and would encourage participants to engage in activities that are not internationally 
competitive). 
 33. SINGER, supra note 4, at 55. 
 34. Id. at 60. 
 35. Id. at 66–70. 
 36. Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004). 
 37. Id. at 640–41. 
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embraces market liberalism and the rhetoric of consumer choice as its 
fundamental guideposts.”38  Yet, while Singer is probably correct that the 
process/product distinction has become too heavy-handed and artificial, 
he is mistaken in attacking the nuanced and rational WTO jurisprudence 
interpreting GATT Article XX.  It is vital for a well-functioning and 
efficient global economy that barriers to free trade be systematically 
reduced.  As Professor Kym Anderson has demonstrated, “subsidies and 
trade barriers are not only economically wasteful but many also have 
harmful social and environmental effects” and “there are almost always 
cheaper ways of obtaining those social and environmental effects than 
via trade and subsidy measures.”39 
Singer’s second, third, and fourth attacks on the WTO are 
interrelated: the WTO erodes national sovereignty,40 is undemocratic,41 
and exacerbates world poverty.42  The pragmatic response is yes, the 
consensual global tempering of national sovereignty (which is driven by 
special interest groups who influence politicians to pass protective, trade-
restrictive, rent-seeking national laws) is one of the key purposes of the 
WTO—a purpose that is beneficial to all the world’s people through 
poverty alleviation and enhanced environmental quality.43  Nation-states 
are not forced to join the WTO.  They choose to join (or seek to join) 
because of the fourfold national benefits they perceive as being part of a 
global trading community: (1) geopolitical stability, (2) efficient use of  
 
                                                     
 38. Id. at 641. 
 39. Kym Anderson, Subsidies and Trade Barriers, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 
supra note 32, at 541, 569. 
 40. SINGER, supra note 4, at 70–75. 
 41. Id. at 75–77. 
 42. Id. at 77–90. 
 43. Significantly, while Singer concludes that his first three charges against the WTO are 
proven (by his own flawed interpretation of the evidence), “the fourth, and arguably most important 
charge against the WTO, . . . that it makes the rich richer and the poor poorer, . . . has . . . not [been] 
proven.”  Id. at 90–91.  See also Anderson, supra note 39, at 562–63 (discussing how trade reform 
can help alleviate poverty).  As Anderson explains in detail: 
  Much environmental damage in developing countries is a direct consequence of 
poverty (e.g. the slash-and-burn shifting agriculture of landless unemployed squatters).  
Insofar as trade reform reduces poverty, so it will reduce such damage.  More generally, 
the relationships between per capita income and a wide range of environmental 
indicators have been studied extensively.  Because richer people have a greater demand 
for a clean environment, income rises tend to be associated with better environmental 
outcomes once incomes rise above certain levels.  Even though more pollutive products 
are being consumed as incomes rise, many abatement practices have been spreading fast 
enough to more than compensate.  And openness to trade accelerates that spread of 
abatement ideas and technologies, making their implementation in developing countries 
affordable at ever-earlier stages of development. 
Id. at 563 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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scarce resources, (3) wealth creation, and (4) dissemination of 
information and technology.44 
Singer completes his diatribe against the WTO and globalization by 
raising some useful points that, while not carrying his argument, show 
the need for the global community to make further improvements in the 
social welfare of the people who live in the poorest countries on the 
planet.  Unquestionably, we need to do a better collective job of raising 
individual life expectancies, increasing per capita incomes, alleviating 
hunger and undernourishment, and making globalization beneficial to all 
the world’s inhabitants.45  Without a doubt, the rich member states of the 
WTO have to be less hypocritical and self-serving by more honestly and 
sincerely matching their rhetorical calls for greater free trade with their 
(often hidden) continuing protectionist measures (like imposition of 
much higher tariffs on manufactured goods from poor countries than on 
similar imports from rich countries and continued subsidization of 
domestic agricultural interests).46  Yet, Singer is unpersuasive when he 
leans hard to the left and suggests that a “global authority to set 
minimum standards on issues like child labor, worker safety, the right to 
form a union, and environmental and animal welfare protection”47 is 
advisable.  Singer, by contrast, is more convincing when he notes that the 
WTO’s 2001 ministerial meeting at Doha might have signaled “a new 
concern for the interests of developing countries, including the world’s 
poorest countries, and a willingness to consider other values as a 
constraint on what had hitherto been the overriding value of free trade.”48 
It would be more practical to utilize the existing structure of the 
WTO to bring about a step-by-step evolutionary incorporation of basic 
environmental and labor standards into the corpus of global trade rules 
than to establish warring, supranational single-issue agencies to issue 
edicts on these vital, but subsidiary, issues.49  Moreover, if the WTO 
                                                     
 44. DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1127–29 (2d. 
ed. 2002). 
 45. See SINGER, supra note 4, at 86–90 (considering various measures of well-being). 
 46. Id. at 95. 
 47. Id. at 92; see also id. at 95 (stating that the WTO could promote “minimum standards for 
environmental protection, worker safety, union rights, and animal welfare”). 
 48. Id. at 91.  Singer qualifies this optimistic assessment with a more cynical one: “It will be 
several years before we know whether these [Doha] declarations were merely good public relations 
or a sign of a substantial change in the thinking of the WTO that will make a real difference.”  Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Against Sustainable Development Grand Theory: A Plea for 
Pragmatism in Resolving Disputes Involving International Trade and the Environment, 29 VT. L. 
REV. 733, 742 (2005).   As I stated previously: 
Despite the surface attractiveness of grand sustainable development theories for 
centralizing international environmental governance into one global super-agency, for 
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continues to moderate and soften its process/product distinction and to 
foster greater information to be freely disseminated concerning how 
products and services are produced, consumers in the global marketplace 
will become more adept in picking more environment- and labor-friendly 
commerce and bidding up the relative value of these trade items.50 
B. Public Citizen’s Political Frontal Attack 
Public Citizen—a nonprofit citizen group founded by Ralph Nader in 
1971 and based in Washington, D.C.—facilitated the 2004 publication of 
a book authored by Lori Wallach and Patrick Woodall entitled Whose 
Trade Organization?: A Comprehensive Guide to the WTO.51 
The Public Citizen book is divided into twelve chapters (an 
introduction, ten numbered chapters, and a conclusion).  The 
introduction, entitled “It’s Not About Trade,” contends that “the World 
Trade Organization—and the sprawling rules that it enforces—actually 
covers a huge array of subjects not included in past trade agreements that 
extend far beyond trade matters.”52  Upset with the emergence of more 
expansive and uniform international trading rules under the WTO, the 
book makes the misguided point that “[i]nstead of setting terms for 
international trade—exchange between different nations—these rules are 
                                                                                                                                  
three reasons, it is naïve to expect that these centralizing/totalizing/top-down institutional 
schemes would lead to better coordination and coherence of international environmental 
standards, in general, or would result in better, more satisfactory resolution of trade 
versus environmental disputes.  First, global environmental governance and sustainable 
development are problems that are primarily political and economic rather than structural.  
It seems highly doubtful that a global super-agency would be any more successful than 
the ad hoc progress that has been achieved (or any more adept at resolving future 
problems).  Geopolitical “dog fights” are a realistic feature of international environmental 
and sustainable development disputes and will not go away by reconfiguring lines and 
boxes on an organization chart.  Second, there is an inherent conflict between calls for a 
more powerful, centralized global environmental organization and increased citizen and 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) participation.  Effective international sustainable 
development participation is probably more likely to occur in ad hoc settings and more 
workable on an issue-by-issue basis.  Third, it seems likely that the creation of centralized 
global governing bodies with greater powers to craft international environmental law 
would hinder sustainable development, rather than promote it.  Sustainable development . 
. . is primarily important as a contestable concept, and ultimately, agreement over the 
precise definition of the term is less important than the debate that is sparked by its 
brilliant ambiguity—a debate that can more fruitfully take place in numerous fora and 
varying contexts. 
Id. at 742–43 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 50. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text (discussing the WTO’s process/product 
distinction). 
 51. LORI WALLACH & PATRICK WOODALL, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION?: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE WTO (2004). 
 52. Id. at 1. 
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aimed at eliminating the diversity of national policies, priorities, and 
cultures to create the uniform world market sought by large multinational 
corporations.”53  Yet, it is the various nation-states which seek a global 
trading arena with a uniform set of free-trade principles that are designed 
to pierce through nontariff trade restrictions disguised as national 
policies; while the “multinational corporations” have pressed for this rule 
set, it is the sovereign national governments of the world which have 
decided, in their collective wisdom, to adopt the rules.  But, the book 
attributes the rise of the WTO to a massive conspiracy theory.54  The 
description of the protests in the streets of Seattle in December 1999 
sounds like a dispatch from a socialist revolution, wherein it is claimed 
that anti-WTO activists (a “truly immovable mass of grassroots 
democracy”) were responsible for blocking “[t]he allegedly unstoppable 
                                                     
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 3–5.  According to the Public Citizen book, the international agreement which 
establishes the “WTO and the 18 major agreements setting rules to which every signatory nation 
must conform their domestic policies” is characterized by the following eight themes: 
• privatize and commodify all elements of the economy and society by pushing 
countries to treat everything from bulk water and public services to genetic 
materials and food as commodities to be made accessible as new for-profit 
tradeable units; 
• deregulate by constraining the role of all levels of government and 
designating some domestic environmental, food safety and other regulations 
as trade barriers that must be eliminated; 
• harmonize by pressuring countries to replace national and local policies with 
uniform global standards that are presumed to be WTO compliant while 
national standards providing a greater level of consumer protection in 
pesticide and meat inspection standards, environmental policies, accounting 
rules and more are exposed to WTO challenge; 
• “liberalize” investment by requiring governments to eliminate policies 
regulating who can own what, including essential services, and to eliminate 
conditions on investors, such as requiring certain labor standards or 
environmental protections; 
• “liberalize” finance by requiring countries to eliminate policies regulating 
banks, currency trading, derivatives, and stock markets; 
• manage trade according to WTO rules.  In contrast to “free trade,” this is a 
“corporate-managed trade” system because of the special protections it 
provides for certain interests.  For instance the WTO protects subsidies given 
to agribusiness to export commodities (thus allowing them to be dumped on 
markets at prices below the cost of production) while certain domestic 
subsidies to support small farms are characterized as illegal trade distortions; 
• create new property protections, for instance requiring nations to adopt 
twenty-year monopoly patents on a wide array of items and giving foreign 
investors special rights not enjoyed by local businesses or citizens; and 
• homogenize culture and consumer demands by treating culture as another 
commodity and eliminating government policies aimed at maintaining diverse 
media content. 
Id. at 4–5. 
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force of corporate-led globalization” and subjecting this “force” to 
“democratic accountability” and restraint.55 
Chapter 1 of the book focuses on the “WTO’s [e]nvironmental 
[i]mpact.”56  On the one hand, the least persuasive segments of this 
chapter are heavy on trade-bashing rhetoric.  Examples along this line 
include the two following items.  Item 1: “Environmentalists [concerned 
about the WTO before it came into existence in 1995] feared that the 
WTO’s expansive new enforcement powers, combined with the 
antienvironmental bias in the substantive rules, would produce dire 
consequences for global environmental protection.”57  Item 2: “Despite 
the growing record of damaging evidence, neither the WTO Secretariat 
nor most WTO members . . . view the WTO as causing environmental 
problems.  Although as the threats of WTO action against green policies 
escalate, it appears some view environmental policies as causing trade 
problems.”58 
Conversely, the most convincing portions of this Public Citizen 
chapter are fact-specific and nuanced.  Worthy Example 1: The WTO has 
created counterproductive “[i]ncentives for [r]ip-and-[s]hip [e]xploitation 
of [n]atural [r]esources”59 because 
[t]he Uruguay Round tariff schedules promote unsustainable rip-and-
ship exploitation of forests, fisheries and minerals.  The tariff escalation 
built into these schedules creates an incentive to ship unfinished 
materials.  For example, rough tropical timber comes into the U.S. duty 
free, but plywood veneered with tropical wood has a tariff of 8%, and 
almost all furniture above a limiting quota receives a 40% tariff.60 
Worthy Example 2: The WTO and other international institutions 
have fostered the destruction of forests: 
                                                     
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. Id. at 19–50.  Most of the remaining substantive chapters of the book, two through eight 
and ten, address issues beyond the scope of trade and the environment—such as the WTO’s impact 
on food safety issues, on public health, on trade in services, on developing nations’ economies, on 
agriculture, on human and labor rights, and the parallels between the WTO and the proposed Free 
Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA).  Id. at 51–238, 262–81.  However, Chapter 9 (addressing the 
WTO’s operating procedures and enforcement system) is related to trade and environment issues, id. 
at 239–61, and will, therefore, be discussed later in my critique.  See infra notes 62–73 and 
accompanying text. 
 57. WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 51, at 19. 
 58. Id. at 50. 
 59. Id. at 21. 
 60. Id. 
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The elimination of global commodity trade agreements (which used to 
set volume and price terms), as well as Uruguay Round tariff and quota 
cuts for many agricultural commodities such as coffee and cocoa, has 
increased the clearance of forests.  Uruguay Round agriculture policy 
changes also have resulted in plummeting commodity prices, meaning 
that farmers have to produce more to make the same amount of money, 
pushing them to slash and burn more forests to expand their acreage.  
Meanwhile, in the face of falling commodity prices and continued 
pressure by the IMF and World Bank to pay back debts in hard 
currencies earned by exports, governments of developing countries are 
under pressure not to halt such forest destruction and indeed to 
intensify production of raw natural resources and cash crops that 
generate export earnings.61 
One can conclude, from reflecting on the above observations 
concerning Public Citizen’s Chapter 1 discussion, that the best way to 
approach trade and environment issues is to withhold broad-sweeping 
generalizations, avoid imputation of bad motives, and concentrate on 
concrete facts rather than abstract theoretical musings. 
Public Citizen’s Chapter 9 is proactively entitled “The WTO’s 
Operating Procedures and Enforcement System: World Government by 
Slow-Motion Coup D’État”;62 its target is the WTO’s Dispute Resolution 
Understanding that “replaced the GATT . . . and its dispute resolution 
system, which relied more on diplomatic negotiation over disputes and 
which required consensus by all GATT countries for GATT dispute 
tribunal rulings to be adopted.”63  Public Citizen objects to the power of 
WTO panel rulings, which are “unique among all other international 
agreements in that consensus is required to stop action.”64  Moreover, 
Public Citizen is also concerned with the official U.S. government 
position that WTO-determined trade “sanctions or negotiated 
compensation are only interim measures and that WTO rules require 
countries to amend their domestic laws to comply with WTO rulings.”65  
In addition, Public Citizen contends that the WTO “enforcement system 
is not designed to be a neutral arbitrator of disagreement between 
countries” since “WTO’s stated purpose is expanding . . . trade in goods  
 
                                                     
 61. Id. at 44. 
 62. Id. at 239. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 240. 
 65. Id. 
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and services and its enforcement system is designed to implement that 
purpose.”66  In particular, Public Citizen is upset that 
[m]any national policies that can run afoul of WTO’s expansive rules 
are aimed at noneconomic goals, such as environmental or public 
health protection or labor-rights guarantees.  While such policy making 
on the domestic level takes into account economic considerations, once 
such laws are subject to a WTO panel’s review their validity is judged 
exclusively according to their conformity with WTO rules aimed only 
at maximizing trade and investment flows.67 
Thus, according to Public Citizen, “[t]he WTO’s binding dispute 
resolution procedure and the Uruguay Round’s expansive new rules 
encroaching into areas traditionally considered the realm of domestic 
policy effectively shift many decisions from democratically elected 
domestic bodies to secretive WTO tribunals.”68  Accordingly, “[t]his 
systematic shift of decision making away from accountable, open fora, 
such as parliaments and city councils is inherently troubling to those 
committed to the future of accountable, democratic governance in the era 
of globalization.”69 
The Public Citizen critique uncovers one of the most difficult 
normative questions surrounding the WTO: Should expansion of 
international trade and the concomitant elimination of nontariff trade 
barriers with lowering of tariffs over time be a preeminent and trumping 
international legal principle, or should domestic health, food safety, 
labor, or environmental laws coupled with international environmental 
treaties be given equal or greater weight in trade disputes?  In my view, 
in light of the broad, macroeconomic benefits that flow from free trade70 
and the voluntary undertaking of individual nation-states to join the 
WTO, reasonable trade liberalization is an appropriate supreme legal 
standard to be pursued by WTO dispute panels.  This is what I have 
called a “‘blue’ canon of interpretation (inspired by the open blue, 
borderless planet floating in space—[construing trade treaties in 
juxtaposition with competing national laws] in favor of as much 
                                                     
 66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  “However, its implications are made worse by the abysmal lack of basic due process 
protection built into the powerful WTO dispute-resolution system.  Although there has been ample 
criticism of the WTO’s dispute-resolution mechanism and outcomes, little has been done to address 
the many demonstrated failures of the system.”  Id. at 240–41. 
 70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing perceived benefits of being part of a 
global trading community). 
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liberalized and free trade as is reasonably feasible).”71  Yet, because of 
the vital importance of environmentally protective laws (whether 
domestic or international), I have also advocated a “green” canon of 
interpretation—which would urge WTO panel members to construe 
competing environmental laws as allowing as much environmental 
protection as is reasonably feasible.72  And, Public Citizen is right to 
insist on reasonable procedural improvements in the function of WTO 
dispute panels.  Indeed, the WTO should be reformed in the following 
ways suggested by Public Citizen: (1) broaden the expertise of WTO 
tribunalists beyond those with expertise in merely international 
commerce to include arbitrators with expertise in environmental, health, 
and safety policy; (2) provide for required consultation of WTO 
arbitrators with environmental experts or experts in general international 
law when these matters are requested by a party to a dispute; (3) tighten 
conflict of interest standards for WTO arbitrators; (4) open up WTO 
cases to third-party amicus briefs; and (5) consider the creation of a 
prestigious court of last resort from the WTO’s Appellate Body or the 
referral of final appeals to the World Court by way of discretionary 
review.73 
C. Corey Lofdahl’s Systems Critique 
In an incisive and penetrating 2002 book, Environmental Impacts of 
Globalization and Trade,74 Corey L. Lofdahl employs a systems 
dynamics model to make explicit the complex causal relationships 
between world trade and environmental degradation.75  Using lateral 
pressure theory, Lofdahl concludes that Gross National Product (GNP) 
increases in developed countries are linked to deforestation in poorer, 
developing countries.76 
Inspired by Professor Edward O. Wilson’s magisterial book, 
Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge,77 Lofdahl contends that “while the 
                                                     
 71. Blomquist, supra note 49, at 753. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See WALLACH & WOODALL, supra note 51, at 246–50 (discussing problems with and 
possible reformations to the WTO). 
 74. COREY L. LOFDAHL, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION AND TRADE (2002). 
 75. Id. at 127–54. 
 76. Id. 
 77. EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (1998).  Lofdahl quotes 
Wilson as follows: 
The greatest enterprise of the human mind always has been and always will be the 
attempted linkage of the [natural] sciences and the [social] humanities.  The ongoing 
fragmentation of knowledge and resulting chaos in philosophy are not reflections of the 
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problems of global environmental degradation are essentially physical, 
their solution has to be political.  To study this topic [of the 
environmental impacts of globalization and trade] one must understand 
both social and natural environments.”78  As a prelude to his quantitative 
study of the environmental impacts of globalization and trade, Lofdahl 
makes a number of trenchant overarching observations that are worthy of 
attention. 
First, he defines the term “globalization” as “increased linkages 
across national boundaries, expansion of the international market 
economy, and a complex and integrated world society.”79  Globalization 
entails trade, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Multi-National 
Corporations (MNCs), advanced communication technologies, and 
migration” of humans.80 
Second, Lofdahl summarizes the literature in favor of globalization.  
In this regard, he gathers from business books that “adaptation, 
competition, and survival” by persons and firms are essential in order to 
benefit from globalization and that excellence in “corporate culture, 
human resources, strategies, operations, structure, and organizational 
learning of best practices” by exemplary companies like General 
Electric, Whirlpool, Colgate-Palmolive, Shell, Coca-Cola, Xerox, 
Federal Express, and Hewlett-Packard is indispensable.81  Moreover, 
Lofdahl favorably notes business theorists who argue “that companies 
must serve customers, not governments; wealth comes from markets, not 
natural resources; and national borders are irrelevant.”82  Lofdahl draws 
upon economists in support of globalization, too; they claim “that 
Americans have historically benefited from globalization as trade 
delivered cheaper and better foreign goods, fostered improved 
international relations through the export of democracy, and even helped 
the United States win the Cold War.”83  Lofdahl rounds out his summary 
of the benefits of globalization by casting the matter as a philosophical 
question “that centers on whether individuals choose their lifestyles for 
themselves or whether society determines lifestyles for the individual.”84  
                                                                                                                                  
real world but artifacts of scholarship.  The propositions of the original Enlightenment are 
increasingly favored by objective evidence, especially from the natural sciences. 
LOFDAHL, supra note 74, at xviii (alteration in original) (quoting WILSON, supra, at 8). 
 78. LOFDAHL, supra note 74, at xviii. 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. at 6 (describing “a recipe for global success”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
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“The answer, according to . . . globalization’s proponents, is a 
resounding yes for individual choice” where “[g]lobalization is not so 
much the result of American power as the natural and progressive 
development of international relations, cultural institutions, and the rise 
of individualism.”85 
Third, Lofdahl recaps the downsides of globalization.  In this regard, 
he gathers “progressive international economic scholarship . . . that 
highlights the unintended consequences and costs of globalization from 
the point of view of poor, developing countries.”86  Focusing on 
“emerging, global forms of production, exchange, and governance from 
the perspective of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, East Asia, and 
Latin America,” Lofdahl cites economic studies that show “that the poor 
in these regions experience significant unmet needs including hunger, 
housing, unemployment, poverty, human rights, and the degradation of 
their natural environment.”87  He goes on to provide a synopsis of 
economic critiques of MNCs as “powerful international actors that 
further globalization and cause many of its significant negative 
consequences.”88  MNCs range across national frontiers and “are 
unbounded by national loyalties and are free to pursue short-term 
economic gain, which often comes at the expense of the natural 
environment.”89  Lofdahl cites studies that claim “that globalization is a 
socially destabilizing force, both at the personal and national levels”90 
and contend that “[d]eveloped countries protect their domestic 
environments by moving production to developing countries where 
environmental standards are looser, which effectively exports 
pollution.”91 
Lofdahl’s principal contribution to understanding trade and the 
environment is his development of a quantitative simulation model that 
“demonstrates just how the North pushes its environmental costs to the 
South.”92  Specifically, Lofdahl’s model is what he calls an 
Environmental Lateral Pressure model that turns on “three master 
variables of lateral pressure: population, technology, and resources.”93  
The statistical results generated by analysis of Trade Connected GNP 
                                                     
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 8. 
 91. Id. at 9. 
 92. Id. at 128. 
 93. Id. at 137. 
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between the rich countries of the North and the poor countries of the 
South demonstrate 
that trade provides the mechanism by which the costs of 
industrialization are pushed off by rich countries onto poor ones.  . . . 
These terms of trade deliver asymmetric benefits: economic 
development and a clean environment for the North; economic 
stagnation and environmental degradation for the South.  . . . If one 
works for a rich, northern MNC and is reaping the rewards of 
globalization, then one will tend to support trade.  If one is instead an 
unemployed citizen of a poor, southern country, then one is more likely 
to be suspicious of globalization’s benefits.  That wealth drives 
environmental externalization also makes sense from a micro 
perspective: if the citizens of a rich, northern country desire a product 
with prohibitive environmental costs—say, cheap wood furniture—then 
if given the opportunity, they will import the product from a developing 
country rather than pay higher prices, or they will do without.  Such 
decisions are made almost automatically by the market’s, “invisible 
hand,” made all the more invisible by the modern, international 
economy.  Developing countries, in some sense, are forced by their 
poverty into responding to such forces and selling their natural 
resources, thereby placing them into the also-ran role of commodity 
provider.94 
Corey Lofdahl suggests a pragmatic way to think about trade and the 
environment by offering what Professor Sanford E. Gaines calls a 
“sociopolitical critique of trade policy” that constitutes “a fresh and 
disquieting analysis of deeper environmental and economic 
consequences of current patterns of world trade.”95  As Gaines argues, if 
Lofdahl is right, “the strategy of externalizing significant environmental 
costs has worked for developed countries because they have had 
developing countries available to provide the resources they need and 
absorb the displaced environmental harms associated with their 
extraction.”96  Indeed, “[t]he global effort to achieve sustainable 
development, though, has the goal of raising GNP levels in developing 
countries, and the trade-environment relationship must be judged on the 
capacity of trade to promote sustainable development broadly.”97  
Lofdahl’s lateral pressure theory analysis uncovers the fundamental 
trade-environment problem: “the possibility that developing countries 
will be unable to replicate the development trajectory of the developed 
                                                     
 94. Id. at 157. 
 95. Sanford E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and What 
to Do About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 338 (2003). 
 96. Id. at 339. 
 97. Id. 
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countries because they have no place to externalize the environmental 
costs associated with their own increased consumption of resources as 
they try to develop their economies.”98 
While there are some minor flaws with Lofdahl’s analysis,99 it is 
attractive for its influence on policy makers and its popular resonance,100 
as well as its “dovetail[ing] with the environmental questioning of the 
fundamental legitimacy of trade policy in an ecologically-limited 
world.”101  Moreover, Lofdahl’s insights fit with the analysis of Thomas 
Princen, who has emphasized the problem of exportability involving “the 
increasing ease of exporting the risks of critical threats and escaping 
responsibility for their creation” in the international trading system.102 
III. ENVIRONMENTAL OPTIMISTS OF GLOBALIZATION 
A. Jagdish Bhagwati’s Plea to Cope with and Improve Globalization 
In his sweeping and ambitious book, In Defense of Globalization,103 
Professor Jagdish Bhagwati claims that “[g]lobalization has a human 
face, but we can make that face . . . more agreeable.”104  Bhagwati makes 
his case for fixing—not scrapping—globalization in five parts.  He 
focuses Part I on “understanding the anti-globalization movement and 
defining its concerns, while analyzing the growth of non-governmental 
organizations that play a principal role in the anti-globalization 
phenomenon and can play an important role in the design of appropriate 
                                                     
 98. Id.  “In other words, international trade may have been ‘mutually supportive’ of 
environmental protection from the perspective of the developed economies, but it may not be able to 
operate in the same mutually supportive fashion for the developing countries.”  Id. 
 99. As Gaines has pointed out: “Among the methodological questions that arise is whether 
forest cover [in Lofdahl’s model] is a suitable proxy for relationships in trade of natural resources.  
Substantial proportions of tropical deforestation and temperate region afforestation are attributable to 
demographic pressures and changing agricultural practices within countries, not to trade in forest 
products.”  Id. n.57. 
 100. Id. at 339. 
 101. Id. at 339–40 (citing HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN R. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: 
REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE 143–44 (1994); Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 675 
(2003); Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001)). 
 102. Id. at 341 (quoting Thomas Princen, Principles for Sustainability: From Cooperation and 
Efficiency to Sufficiency, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 33, 40 (2003)).  For Professor Gaines’s most recent 
insights on this topic, see CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT (2005). 
 103. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004). 
 104. Id. at x. 
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governance to improve outcomes from globalization.”105  In Part II, 
Bhagwati tackles several discrete potential problems raised by 
international trade via MNCs including: (1) Poverty: Enhanced or 
Diminished?;106 (2) Child Labor: Increased or Reduced?;107 (3) Women: 
                                                     
 105. Id.  Bhagwati makes a number of well thought-out points in this Part.  First, he defines 
globalization broadly as “economic globalization.”  Id. at 3.  “Economic globalization constitutes 
integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign 
investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of 
workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology . . . .”  Id.  Second, antiglobalization is the 
product of a number of influences: from anticapitalist ideologues, to anticorporation attitudes, to the 
philosophical views of communitarianism, to anti-Americanism.  Id. at 21–27.  Third, he asserts that 
it is appropriate to “believe that globalization has a human face” that should be ameliorated by 
“policies to enhance, supplement, complement, and accentuate its good outcomes.”  Id. at 31.  
Fourth, he contends that three principal prescriptions should be followed in “making the beneficial 
globalization process work even better.”  Id. at 32.  These three prescriptions are as follows: 
  The beneficial outcomes are only what economists call a “central tendency,” which is 
to say that they hold for the most part but not always.  They leave room for downsides, 
and we must have institutional mechanisms to cope with such adverse outcomes if and 
when they materialize. 
  Also, we will want to go faster in achieving social agendas than globalization permits 
and facilitates.  The question then is: what choice of policy and institutions will achieve 
that acceleration? 
  Finally, we can never forget also that a transition to more rewarding globalization 
requires careful steering and optimal speed of policy changes, not maximal speed à la the 
“shock therapy” of excessively rapid reforms that devastated Russia. 
Id. 
 106. Id. at 51 (quotation marks omitted).  Bhagwati’s discussion of potential environmental 
perils, id. at 135–61, is assessed in detail later in this Article.  See infra notes 119–39 and 
accompanying text.  Bhagwati’s discussion of poverty aspects of globalization, BHAGWATI, supra 
note 103, at 51–67, makes a number of salient observations.  First, for trade to enhance a nation’s 
growth and thereby reduce poverty, growth should not be “a passive, trickle-down strategy for 
helping the poor,” but rather should be “an active, pull-up strategy instead.”  Id. at 54.  Second, 
developing economies need to diversify into production of multiple labor-intensive industries in 
order to avoid depressed terms of trade coming about from overproduction (leading to price 
decrease) of one commodity—like Bangladesh’s unhappy experience with jute production in the 
1950s.  Id. at 54–55.  Third, developing economies should eschew import substitution strategies 
since such misguided approaches undermine “the cause of the poor by reducing growth and by 
delinking it from increased [foreign] demand for the low-grade labor that constitutes the bulk of the 
poor.”  Id. at 56–57.  Fourth, to allow the poor in developing countries to gain optimal access to 
capital, bureaucrats should be replaced as much as possible by markets since “far too many 
bureaucrats impose senseless restrictions just to collect bribes or to exercise power.”  Id. at 58.  
Fifth, political democracy and such legal innovations as allowing NGOs to have standing on behalf 
of the poor are “a powerful tool for aiding the poor.”  Id. at 58–59.  Sixth, other virtuous social 
policies—such as “high literacy, and emphasis on higher education”—need to work in tandem with 
wise economic policies to assist the poor.  Id. at 63. 
 107. Id. at 68 (quotation marks omitted).  Bhagwati articulates several penetrating observations 
about globalization and child labor.  First, “globalization—wherever it translates into greater general 
prosperity and reduced poverty—only accelerates the reduction of child labor and enhances primary 
school enrollment and hence literacy.”  Id.  Parents in poor developing countries, when able to earn a 
moderate amount of additional income through the benefits of freer trade, tend, pursuant to what 
economists label the “income effect,” to invest in greater education of their children.  Id. at 69–70.  
Third, recent econometric data examining Vietnamese households confirm the operation of the 
income effect of parents investing in greater education for their children when enjoying greater 
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Harmed or Helped?;108 (4) Democracy at Bay?;109 (5) Culture Imperiled 
or Enriched?;110 (6) Wages and Labor Standards at Stake?;111 and (7) 
                                                                                                                                  
income from rice exports grown by their parents.  Id. at 71.  A “caveat” is in order, however, 
regarding the following problem: 
  The increased demand for labor in some of the labor-scarce Middle Eastern nations 
without modern protections and rights, especially Saudi Arabia, has led to the cross-
border movements of women and their children, employed as domestic labor, often in 
poor conditions.  Child prostitution has also intensified, with female children being 
transported across borders and sold into brothels.  These are products of globalization 
only in the sense that there are profits to be had in movements across borders.  And all 
are agreed that these developments call for corrective action. 
Id. at 72. 
 108. Id. at 73 (quotation marks omitted).  Bhagwati explains “[t]hat globalization can help rather 
than harm women” as illustrated by “how globalization has affected the women of Japan.”  Id. at 74.  
This positive impact on Japanese women was due to their exposure to Western culture when they 
moved with their husband-executives of multinational corporations to the United States and other 
Western nations and from an increase in Japanese women studying at Western universities.  Id. at 
74–75.  Moreover, he contends that gender discrimination is costly and that globalization tends to 
put competitive pressure on firms to stop this type of discrimination.  Id. at 76.  Yet, Bhagwati, by 
acknowledging “three critical phenomena, tangentially related to globalization, that pose 
unambiguous threats to women’s well-being,” id. at 89, demonstrates his evenhanded credibility and 
honesty in evaluating the good and the bad of globalization.  These three threats to women’s welfare 
are: 
• Women going abroad as domestic servants—often to the Middle East, where 
local women are typically living in the Middle Ages . . . have been subjected 
to abuse and need protection. 
• The growth of tourism has inevitably been accompanied by a rise in female 
and even male prostitution in countries such as Thailand. 
• Trafficking in women has grown, especially with the economic distress that 
has attended attempts at transition in countries such as Russia and from 
financial crises in afflicted Asian countries. 
Id. at 89. 
 109. Id. at 92 (quotation marks omitted).  Professor Bhagwati offers us a paradox on the issue of 
globalization and democracy: “globalization promotes democracy while constraining it at the same 
time.”  Id. at 93.  On the one hand, he notes that “[g]lobalization promotes democracy both directly 
and indirectly.”  Id.  This is the case, according to Bhagwati, because: 
The direct link comes from the fact that rural farmers are now able to bypass the 
dominant classes and castes by taking their produce directly to the market thanks to 
modern information technology, thereby loosening the control of these traditionally 
hegemonic groups.  In turn, this can start them on the way to becoming more-independent 
actors, with democratic aspirations, in the political arena. 
Id.  On the other hand, Bhagwati admits that, given the centralized structure of trade organizations 
such as the WTO, a full panoply of democratic procedures available at the domestic level in some 
countries may not be available.  Id. at 104–05. 
 110. Id. at 106 (quotation marks omitted).  In a far-ranging discussion on globalization and 
culture, Bhagwati concludes that “[w]here Americans see technology as solving problems, others see 
it as creating them.”  Id. at 121.  “That difference . . . for sure, underlies the contrasting positions 
taken by Americans and the Europeans on the issues of hormone-fed beef and genetically modified 
(GM) products.”  Id.  Thus, “Americans uniquely find it difficult to see why free trade in cinema, 
television, GM products, and so on is considered by others to pose a threat to their culture and well-
being.”  Id. 
 111. Id. at 122 (quotation marks omitted).  Bhagwati claims that available economic evidence 
shows that globalization has created a paradoxical “race to the top” in global wages and labor 
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Corporations: Predatory or Beneficial?112  Moreover, a separate chapter 
in this Part focuses on the environmental impacts of globalization,113 
which is discussed at length below.114  In Part III of his book, Bhagwati 
addresses “other facets of economic globalization: short-term capital 
flows and the movements of people across borders.”115  In Part IV, he 
“consider[s] the design of institutional changes, both domestic and 
international, that are necessary to make the generally good effects of 
globalization even better.”116  Interestingly, Bhagwati parts company, in 
this Part, with “the anti-globalization critics: the appropriate 
governance—that is, institutions and politics—that goes with a 
globalization that is seen as having a human face is very different from 
that which attends a globalization that is seen as lacking a human 
face.”117  Finally, in Part V, he concludes with a few pithy parting 
thoughts, the essence of which can be summarized as follows: “[r]eason 
and analysis require that we abandon the conviction that globalization 
lacks a human face, an assertion that is tantamount to a false alarm, and 
embrace the view that it has one.”118 
                                                                                                                                  
standards due to political and economic reasons.  Id. at 127–32. 
 112. Id. at 162 (quotation marks omitted).  Bhagwati argues that “the evidence strongly 
suggests” that multinational corporations have been a beneficial force.  Id. at 163.  He explains that 
the chief beneficial impact from multinational corporations has been positive “spillovers”: 
These refer to the fact that domestic firms learn productivity-enhancing techniques from 
multinationals with better technology and management practices.  We can identify 
channels through which such diffusion may occur.  Managers may learn by observing or 
hearing about better management practices or by the experience of having previously 
worked at multinationals.  Such diffusion may also happen with production workers, who 
learn better discipline, for example, when employed by the foreign firms and then take it 
with them to local firms, where their experience is translated into a better workforce. 
Id. at 180–81. 
 113. Id. at 135–61. 
 114. See infra notes 119–39 and accompanying text. 
 115. BHAGWATI, supra note 103, at x.  As he explains: 
Short-term capital flows, which broadly consist of transactions in stocks and related 
financial instruments for short-term gains as distinct from direct equity investment by 
enterprises for long-term gains, and human movements across borders (legal and illegal, 
voluntary or forced by crisis and circumstance) are in fact two principal forms of 
economic globalization that raise a number of difficult questions . . . deserv[ing] attention 
in a book that is addressed to globalization on a broader scale than just trade and direct 
foreign investment. 
Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  Bhagwati discusses appropriate governance, coping with downsides, accelerating the 
achievement of social agendas, and managing transitions through optimal, not maximal speed in Part 
IV.  Id. at 219–62. 
 118. Id. at 265. 
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Professor Bhagwati asks whether the environment is in peril by the 
continued emergence of free-trade globalization.119  He warms up to the 
subject by observing that “conflict is inevitable” because “[i]mpassioned 
differences often arise from the altogether different philosophies and 
lifestyles of trade economists and environmental activists.”120  In 
particular, according to Bhagwati, “[t]he environmentalists . . . tend to 
value environment over income, whereas trade (and other) economists 
conventionally tend to value income over the environment.”121  From 
these foundational assumptions, Bhagwati highlights a “[c]ommon 
[f]allacy,” held by some environmentalists, “that if trade is freed without 
environmental policies being in place, not only will the environment be 
harmed but the country’s economic welfare will be set back.”122  
Admitting “[t]hat this may happen is surely correct,”123 he claims “[t]hat 
it must happen is incorrect.”124  Citing various empirical data, Bhagwati 
asserts: 
I and my GATT colleagues Richard Blackhurst and Kym Anderson 
addressed this issue in 1991 when I was economic policy adviser to 
[the director general of GATT].  The GATT Secretariat was working 
on a special report on trade and the environment, and we took the 
occasion to clarify matters.  In particular, we provided examples from 
the real world that showed that, contrary to the environmentalists’ 
pessimistic certainties, economic welfare increased with trade 
liberalization even though ideal environmental policies were not in 
place, and that the environment improved also.125 
                                                     
 119. Id. at 135. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 136–37. 
 122. Id. at 138. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id.  Bhagwati pointed out: 
  The most compelling illustration came from agricultural trade liberalization 
contemplated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  Anderson 
calculated that such liberalization would shift agricultural production from higher-cost, 
pesticide-intensive European agriculture to lower-cost, manure-using agriculture in the 
poor countries, so that both income and welfare would increase in each set of countries, 
and total environmental quality would also improve. 
Id.  Bhagwati, however, acknowledges that there have been negative examples where free trade, “in 
the absence of an appropriate environmental policy” that makes producers pay for the pollution they 
cause, can lead to “harmful environmental spillovers.”  Id. at 139–40.  A classic example of harmful 
environmental spillovers is “the rapid expansion of coastal shrimp farming in the 1980s in several 
countries in Asia and Latin America, principally in Ecuador, Colombia, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, India, Bangladesh, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam.”  Id.  Three serious environmental 
problems from the expansion in trade of coastal shrimp-farming were: 
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As Professor Bhagwati sees it, “the optimal policy is to have an 
appropriate environmental policy in place, to look after the environment, 
and then to pursue free trade to reap the gains from trade.”126  He uses the 
conditional word “appropriate,” “[b]ecause, except in the limiting cases 
where you want to put an infinite value on an environmental outcome, 
you are going to have to balance income gains against environmental 
benefit.”127  This insight is pragmatic and realistic—realizing that 
nothing occurs in the real world without some balancing of costs and 
benefits.  Focusing on the example of coastal shrimp harvesting and 
international trade from countries in Asia and Latin America, Bhagwati 
opines: 
In the coastal shrimp case it is hardly sensible to say that the 
environmental considerations should be so overwhelming that no 
environmental damage to mangrove forests should be accepted.  
Rather, such damage must be balanced against the loss from shrimp 
export earnings.  This trade-off will imply a choice somewhere between 
a zero pollution tax and a prohibitive one, of course.  This choice will 
obviously reflect the societal valuation of the environment and income . 
. . .128 
Thus, for Bhagwati, the “[r]eal [q]uestion” boils down to “[h]ow to 
value the environment,” a matter that he urges “needs more scrutiny.”129  
On the one hand, he agrees with the proposition argued by 
environmentalists “that growth rates must be adjusted for environmental 
damage” since “[g]rowth that devastates the environment is surely not 
being correctly measured if no downside adjustment for the 
environmental damage is made.”130  On the other hand, Bhagwati argues 
that “environmentalists are more credible [and more pragmatic] if they 
ask, quite properly, for a rise in the relative valuation of environment to 
income,”131 instead of making a claim “which puts zero weight on 
                                                                                                                                  
• The shrimp ponds produced effluents that contaminated the water supply for 
others (and for themselves as well). 
• They used large quantities of fresh water, which then led to a drop in the water 
table and the intrusion of salt water. 
• Their expansion often led to the destruction of surrounding mangrove forests, 
with serious consequences for commercially valuable fish and shrimp stocks 
which depend on a mangrove habitat . . . . 
Id. at 140 (endnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Id. at 141. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 142. 
BLOMQUIST FINAL.DOC 1/12/2007  2:55:46 PM 
154 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55 
income and infinite weight on environment [preservation].”  Such claims 
are exemplified by inflated environmentalist rhetoric attacking some 
deforestation in the boreal Canadian forests from American “demand for 
softwood, pulp, and paper in the United States” and some deforestation 
in the Brazilian Amazon for “mahogany and other precious 
hardwoods.”132  A pragmatic approach to trade and the environment 
problems, therefore, is characterized by a taste for “systematic and 
comprehensive analysis”133 that appreciates complexity and understands 
that proposed solutions have second-order and feedback consequences.134 
When Professor Bhagwati turns his attention to the policies and 
decisions of the WTO—the preeminent arbiter of trade and 
environmental disputes—he offers several pragmatically insightful 
comments.  In the first place, he suggests that on “safety in agricultural 
trade”135 issues, like hormone-fed beef and genetically modified product 
disputes, a more flexible and useful approach by the WTO Appellate 
Body would be to encourage “eco-labeling” of agricultural products so 
that consumers around the world can decide for themselves—based on 
accurate and pertinent information—what kind of food to consume.136  In 
the second place, regarding “values-related decisions affecting 
production and process methods (PPMs) that violate ethical 
preferences,”137 like tuna fishing methods that harm dolphins or shrimp 
harvesting techniques that injure turtles, Bhagwati counsels prudence and 
wisdom.138  Specifically, he makes the common sense recommendation 
that instead of pursuing ineffective trade sanctions against developing 
nations’ fishermen, who lack the sophisticated and costly technology to 
selectively harvest fish without harming favored marine creatures, “the 
rich and powerful countries that wish to propagate their moral 
preferences . . . should proceed to subsidize the PPMs that they advocate 
(e.g., non-use of purse seine nets and use of TEDs [turtle exclusion 
devices]), putting their own resources where they claim their moral 
preferences are.”139 
                                                     
 132. Id. at 141–42. 
 133. Id. at 143. 
 134. Id.; cf. Robert F. Blomquist, The Beauty of Complexity, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 555, 570–71 
(1988) (reviewing WILLIAM H. RODGER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER (1986)) 
(considering the beauty of environmental law’s complexity). 
 135. BHAGWATI, supra note 103, at 151. 
 136. Id. at 152–53. 
 137. Id. at 153. 
 138. See id. at 155–56 (stating that an “open-ended automatic legitimation of values-related 
PPM-based exclusions is unwise”). 
 139. Id. at 157–58.  Indeed, subsidies are often a more efficient and effective way to legally 
order the environment compared to direct regulation and penalties.  Bhagwati goes on to observe: 
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B. Jeffrey Frankel’s Upbeat View on Three Ways That Globalization 
Can Be Good for the Environment 
In his sober yet buoyant contribution to the 2005 book 
Globalization: What’s New,140 Professor Jeffrey A. Frankel—harking 
back to the street theatrics at the Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in 
Seattle during November 1999 when antiglobalization protestors 
demonstrated while wearing turtle costumes—starts off his chapter, “The 
Environment and Economic Globalization,” with a stark observation.141  
He writes: “Perhaps no aspect of globalization worries the critics more 
than its implications for the environment.”142  Frankel acknowledges that 
such concern is “understandable” and “the case for countries sticking 
their noses into each other’s business is stronger” since “[w]e all share 
[the same] planet.”143  In sparse and elegant prose he puts forth the 
central question of international trade and the environment as follows: 
                                                                                                                                  
[Use of subsidies], in fact, [is] exactly what the signatories to the Kyoto treaty on global 
warming have done: recognizing that the developing countries have resource problems, 
because they are poor, the rich countries have promised resources, financial and 
technological, to enable them to make the switch to processes emitting less carbon into 
the atmosphere.  In the same vein, the best solution to the shrimp-turtle problem would 
surely have been for the United States to buy the TEDs, which presumably cost about $50 
a net, and send them gratis to the developing countries for their use.  I doubt if more than 
about $10 million would have been involved; that is less than a tenth of the money that 
the IMF [International Monetary Fund] spends on travel every year. 
Id. at 158.  For a discussion of the policy tools for legally ordering the environment, see ROGER W. 
FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 62–63 (6th ed. 2003).  For a 
previous discussion by Bhagwati on issues of free trade and the environment, see JAGDISH 
BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 57–67 (2002), which discusses “fair trade arguments that relate to 
differences in (domestic-pollution-related) environmental and labor standards across countries” and 
arguments that “free trade harms the environment.” 
 140. Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Environment and Economic Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION: 
WHAT’S NEW 129–69 (Michael M. Weinstein ed., 2005). 
 141. Id. at 129. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id.  Frankel restates the classic law and economics rationale for legal ordering of the 
environment: 
  Pollution and other forms of environmental degradation are the classic instance of 
what economists call an externality: the condition under which individuals and firms, and 
sometimes even individual countries, lack the incentive to restrain their pollution, 
because under a market system the costs are borne primarily by others.  The phrase 
“tragedy of the commons” was originally coined in the context of a village’s shared 
pasture land, which would inevitably be overgrazed if each farmer were allowed free and 
unrestricted use.  It captures the idea that we will foul our shared air and water supplies 
and deplete our natural resources unless somehow we are individually faced with the 
costs of our actions. 
Id. at 129–30. 
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[W]hether globalization helps or hurts in achieving the best tradeoff 
between environmental and economic goals.  Do international trade and 
investment allow countries to achieve more economic growth for any 
given level of environmental quality?  Or do they undermine 
environmental quality for any given rate of economic growth?  
Globalization is a complex trend, encompassing many forces and many 
effects.  It would be surprising if all of them were always unfavorable 
to the environment, or all of them favorable.  The highest priority 
should be to determine ways in which globalization can be successfully 
harnessed to protect the environment rather than to degrade it.144 
Professor Frankel tells us, in piercing language, “that it is an illusion 
to think that environmental issues can be effectively addressed if each 
country were insulated against incursions into its national sovereignty at 
the hands of international trade or the WTO.”145  Bursting this illusion 
with bracing common sense, he points out that “[i]ncreasingly, people 
living in one country want to protect the air, water, forests, and animals 
not just in their own countries, but also in other countries as well.”146  To 
accomplish these worthy ends, in Frankel’s view, “international 
cooperation is required” and “[n]ational sovereignty is the obstacle to 
such efforts, not the ally.”147  Indeed, “[m]ultilateral institutions are a 
potential ally, not the obstacle.”148 
With his eyes focused on the practical and the concrete, Professor 
Frankel articulates the argument, and previews for the reader, the gist of 
his chapter: there are “three ways in which globalization can be a means 
of environmental improvement.”149  The first way involves “the exercise 
of consumer power.”150  Essentially, the international consumer exercises 
choice by reading product or service labels that describe how a unit of 
potential consumption was or is produced and then the consumer decides 
whether the environmental factors of production justify her purchase.  
But, for environmental labeling to work, according to Frankel, “there 
need to be some rules or standards.  Otherwise, any producer could 
inaccurately label its product as environmentally pure, and any country 
could unfairly put a pejorative label on imports from rival producers.”151 
                                                     
 144. Id. at 130. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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Thus, the second way that globalization can help achieve global 
environmental improvement is through “a system in which countries 
interact under a set of multilateral rules determined in multilateral 
negotiations and monitored by multilateral institutions.”152  As Frankel 
sees it, “the WTO has actually moved importantly in the 
environmentalists’ direction in recent years” by WTO arbitral panel 
decisions which suggest that, under some circumstances, nations “are to 
be allowed to adopt laws that may be trade-restricting, but that have as 
their objective influencing other countries’ process and production 
methods (PPMs), such as their fishermen’s use of nets.”153  The only 
limitation on this WTO trend in trade and environmental law “is that the 
[national PPM] measures cannot be unnecessarily unilateral or 
discriminatory.154  But, “[t]he environmentalist community,” reacting in 
a decidedly unpragmatic manner, “has almost entirely failed to notice 
this major favorable development, because of confusion over” the 
WTO’s qualification of national PPM laws.155  Offering sage advice, 
Frankel opines that the environmental community is behaving foolishly, 
since “[b]y ignoring their victory on the main issue—the legitimacy of 
addressing PPMs—environmentalists risk losing the opportunity to 
consolidate it.”156  Moreover, environmentalists should be wary of 
blowing it, given the political reality that “[s]ome players, particularly 
poor countries, would love to deny the [PPM] precedent set in these 
panel decisions, and to return to a system where other countries cannot 
restrict trade in pursuit of” legitimate concerns about the global 
commons.157  A wise and strategic approach for environmentalists would 
be to engage in debate on “how reasonably to balance both economic and 
environmental objectives”158 before the WTO and other potential 
multilateral tribunals. 
Besides consumer power and multilateralism, there is a third reason 
to think that emerging twenty-first-century globalization can be 
beneficial to the environment: cross-country “statistical evidence on how 
globalization and growth tend to affect environmental objectives” that 
                                                     
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 131. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id.  Reasonableness and the reasonably prudent person standard are concepts with which 
lawyers—particularly tort lawyers—are quite familiar.  See Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting 
Torts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 481, 493 (2005) (describing the common law tort of negligence and its “law 
and economics utilitarian, risk-balancing calculus”). 
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can help policymakers to discern whether global environmental 
externalities remain to be resolved.159  On the one hand, Frankel contends 
that this statistical evidence demonstrates that “[i]ncreased international 
trade turns out . . . beneficial for some environmental measures, such as 
SO2 pollution,” with “little evidence to support the contrary fear that 
international competition in practice works to lower environmental 
standards overall.”160  Instead he argues that “globalization . . . aid[s] the 
process whereby economic growth enables people to demand higher 
environmental quality.”161  On the other hand, Frankel opines that “[f]or 
the increasingly important category of global environmental externalities, 
however, such as greenhouse gases,” comparative statistical evidence 
demonstrates that “regulation at the national level is not enough,” and 
therefore, “[a]n international agreement is necessary.”162  Frankel 
concludes this part of his chapter with a bold synthesis: 
These three new reasons to think that globalization can be beneficial for 
the environment—consumer power, multilateralism, and cross-country 
statistical evidence—are very different in nature.  But in each case what 
is striking is how little the facts correspond to the suspicions of critics 
that turning back the clock on globalization would somehow allow 
them to achieve environmental goals.  The rise in globalization, with 
the attempts at international environmental accord and quasi-judicial 
oversight, is less a threat to the environment than an ally.  It is 
unfettered national sovereignty that poses the larger threat.163 
In the remainder of his essay on the relation between the 
environment and economic globalization, Professor Frankel covers five 
key conceptual points: (1) Objectives, (2) Regulation, (3) Effects of 
Openness to Trade, (4) Potential Conflicts Between Globalization and 
Environmental Regulation, and (5) International Agreements and 
Institutions.164 
                                                     
 159. Frankel, supra note 140, at 131. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  He further elaborates: 
To be sure, effective government regulation is probably required if this demand is ever 
[sic] be translated into actual improvement; the environment cannot take care of itself.  
But the statistical evidence says that high-income countries do indeed eventually tend to 
use some of their wealth to clean up the environment, on average . . . . 
Id. at 131–32. 
 162. Id. at 132. 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at 132–59. 
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1. Objectives 
Professor Frankel lucidly explains that, from a public policy 
standpoint, “both economic income and environmental quality are 
worthy objectives.”165  True, he observes, “[i]ndividuals may disagree on 
the weight that should be placed on one objective or another.”166  Yet, 
“we should not let such disagreements lead to deadlocked political 
outcomes in which the economy and the environment are both worse off 
than necessary.”167  Frankel explains numerous principles concerning 
public objectives.  First he asserts that, contrary to “[a]n extreme version 
of environmental activism [that] argue[s] that we should turn back the 
clock on industrialization,”168 today “[m]ost people believe that both a 
clean environment and economic growth are desirable, that we can have 
a combination of both, and it is a matter of finding the best tradeoff.”169  
In this regard, Frankel stresses the importance of precision in our 
conceptual thinking (“for example to make the distinction between 
effects on the environment that come via rapid economic growth and 
those that come for a given level of economic output”).170  Moreover, he 
laments the lack of a comprehensive and robust measure of 
environmental quality; this is in contrast to the “single concept, GDP, 
that attempts to measure the aggregate value of goods and services that 
are sold in the marketplace, and that does a relatively good job of it.”171 
Second, Frankel posits various classes of environmental objectives, 
based on “the extent to which damage is localized around specific 
sources, as opposed to spilling out over a geographically more extensive 
area.”172  One category of environmental objective should focus on 
                                                     
 165. Id. at 132. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id.  Instead, we should ask interesting and pragmatic questions that have real policy 
payoffs.  Frankel provides a sample of “questions of interest”: 
Can globalization be made to improve the environment that comes with a given level of 
income in market-measured terms?  Many seem to believe that globalization necessarily 
makes things worse.  If Mexico grows rapidly, is an increase in pollution inevitable?  Is it 
likely, on average?  If that growth arises from globalization, rather than from domestic 
sources, does that make environmental damage more likely?  Less likely?  Are there 
policies that can simultaneously promote both economic growth and an improved 
environment? 
Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 133.  “Indeed,” says Frankel, “that is one possible interpretation of the popular phrase 
sustainable development.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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addressing “environmental damage [from] pollution that is internal to the 
household or firm.”173  In this instance, “what households in such 
countries primarily lack are the economic resources to afford stoves that 
run on cleaner fuels.  In the case of internal pollution, higher incomes 
directly allow the solution of the problem.”174  Property rights, according 
to Frankel, can be used to internalize potential externalities.  Difficulties 
arise regarding commons areas, like tropical forest land where, in many 
poor countries, inadequate “institutional and economic resources to 
enforce laws protecting such resources” exist in conjunction with corrupt 
government officials.175  Another kind of environmental objective should 
concentrate on “national externalities, [which] include[] most kinds of 
air pollution and water pollution, the latter a particularly great health 
hazard in the third world.”176  A further class of environmental objectives 
involves “international externalities,” that encompass “environmental 
problems [which] cross national boundaries” like acid rain, where “some 
cooperation among countries is necessary.”177 
Third, Frankel delineates the relationship between economic 
production and environmental impact by defining “three intermediating 
variables or channels of influence that can determine the aggregate 
economic impacts of trade or growth on the environment.”178  These 
three variables are as follows: (1) “[t]he scale of economic activity;”179 
(2) “[t]he composition of economic activity;”180 and (3) “[t]he techniques 
of economic activity.”181  Frankel uses these three variables to explain 
                                                     
 173. Id.  “Perhaps 80 percent (by population) of world exposure to particulates is indoor 
pollution in poor countries—smoke from indoor cooking fires—which need not involve any 
externality.”  Id. 
 174. Id. (endnote omitted). 
 175. Id. at 134. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  “The strongest examples [of international externalities] are purely global externalities: 
chemicals that deplete the stratospheric ozone layer, greenhouse gases that lead to global climate 
change, and habitat destruction that impairs biological diversity.  Individual countries should not 
expect to be able to do much about global externalities on their own.”  Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 135.  “[F]or physical reasons, more output means more pollution, other things equal.  
But other things are usually not equal.”  Id. 
 180. Id.  “Trade and growth can shift the composition of output, for example, among the 
agricultural, manufacturing, and service sectors.  Because environmental damage per unit of output 
varies across these sectors, the aggregate can shift.”  Id. 
 181. Id.  Frankel states: 
Often the same commodity can be produced through a variety of different techniques, 
some cleaner than others.  Electric power, for example, can be generated by a very wide 
range of fuels and techniques.  To the extent trade or growth involve the adoption of 
cleaner techniques, pollution per unit of GDP will fall. 
Id. (endnote omitted). 
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why the relationship between GDP and the environment is complex: 
“sometimes a country’s growth is first bad for the environment and later 
good.”182  Pursuant to his lucid and practical analysis, Frankel explains: 
On the one hand, when GDP increases, the greater scale of production 
leads directly to more pollution and other environmental degradation.  
On the other hand, there tend to be favorable shifts in the composition 
of output and in the techniques of production.  The question is whether 
the latter two effects can outweigh the first.183 
Fourth, Frankel evaluates the so-called Environmental Kuznets 
Curve as another tool for understanding the achievement of 
environmental and economic objectives.  As he points out: “For some 
important environmental measures, a U-shaped relationship appears: at 
relatively low levels of income per capita, growth leads to greater 
environmental damage, until it levels off at an intermediate level of 
income, after which further growth leads to improvements in the 
environment.”184  Frankel persuasively reasons that as countries become 
richer from the profits of early productive enterprises, they eventually 
reach a point where they can afford “to pay to clean up their 
environments.”185  Nonetheless, according to his astute and nuanced 
                                                     
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  According to Frankel: 
This label is by analogy with the original Kuznets Curve, which was a U-shaped 
relationship between average income and inequality.  [According to empirical data] . . . 
this statistical finding for a cross section of countries . . . estimated that SO2 pollution 
peaked when a country’s income was about $5,000–$6,000 per capita (in 1985 dollars).  
Most developing countries have not reached this threshold. 
  For countries where a long enough time series of data is available, there is also some 
evidence that the same U-shaped relationship can hold across time.  The air in London 
was far more polluted in the 1950s than it is today.  (The infamous “pea soup” fogs were 
from pollution.)  The same pattern has held in Tokyo, Los Angeles, and other cities.  A 
similar pattern holds typically with respect to deforestation in rich countries: the 
percentage of U.S. land that was forested fell in the eighteenth century and first half of 
the nineteenth century, but rose in the twentieth century. 
Id. at 135–36 (endnotes omitted). 
 185. Id. at 136.  Frankel explains the theory behind the Environmental Kuznets Curve as 
follows: 
The standard rationale is thus that, at higher levels of income per capita, growth raises the 
public’s demand for environmental quality, which can translate into environmental 
regulation.  Environmental regulation, if effective, then translates into a cleaner 
environment.  It operates largely through the techniques channel, encouraging or 
requiring the use of cleaner production techniques for given products, although regulation 
might also have a composition effect: raising the price of polluting goods and services 
relative to clean ones and thus encouraging consumers to buy more of the latter. 
Id. 
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analysis, just because the Environmental Kuznets Curve shows a 
statistical correlation does not mean that “the environment will 
eventually take care of itself.”186  Rather, Frankel pragmatically asserts 
that since most pollution “is external to the home or firm,” higher 
incomes must meld with “effective government regulation, which usually 
requires a democratic system to translate the popular will into action” 
coupled with “the rule of law and reasonably intelligent mechanisms of 
regulation.”187  Yet, as he acknowledges, at the transnational level, the 
law and politics for regulating “cross-border externalities” are more 
perplexing than at the national level of governance.188  An example of 
this cross-border complexity relates to carbon dioxide emissions.  As 
Frankel concludes: “No Kuznets Curve has yet appeared for carbon 
dioxide,” and “[e]ven though emissions per unit of GDP do tend to fall 
[over time on a national basis], this is not enough to reduce overall 
emissions, in the absence of a multilateral effort.”189 
2. Regulation 
Professor Frankel dissects a number of regulatory issues in 
preparation of his “main subject, the role of globalization per se.”190  
First, he observes that while “[i]t is logical to expect environmental 
regulation to cost something, to have a negative effect on . . . 
productivity and income per capita,” there are, nevertheless, economic 
tools to help policymakers choose wise regulatory initiatives.191  Thus, 
“[c]ost-benefit tests and cost-minimization strategies are economists’ 
tools for trying to make sure that policies deliver the best environment 
for a given economic cost, or the lowest economic cost for a given 
environmental goal.”192  On a continuum of most efficient to least 
efficient environmental interventions, Frankel praises taxes on energy,193 
                                                     
 186. Id.  Although with respect to pollution within homes (such as wood or coal cooking fires), 
increased household wealth will tend to alleviate internal pollution because the homeowners will be 
induced to use their increased wealth to purchase cleaner technology. 
 187. Id.  For a fascinating and learned historical, political, and theoretical study of the rule of 
law ideal from the time of classical Greek and Roman writings to the present, see BRIAN Z. 
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004). 
 188. Frankel, supra note 140, at 136. 
 189. Id. at 137. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  “Taxes on energy . . . particularly on hydrocarbon fuels, are quite an efficient mode of 
environmental regulation (if the revenue is recycled efficiently).”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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is lukewarm about mobile vehicle fuel efficiency standards,194 and 
denigrates “crude command and control methods”195 of environmental 
regulation.  Indeed, he crisply observes that “[s]ome environmental 
regulations, when legislated or implemented poorly, can impose very 
large and unnecessary economic costs on firms, as well as on workers 
and consumers.”196 
Second, in a penetrating and sagacious tenet, Frankel informs us that 
“[o]ccasionally there are policy measures that have both environmental 
and economic benefits” involving “win-win ideas [that] constitute the 
elimination of some previously existing distortion in public policy.”197  
Wasteful subsidy elimination exemplifies these powerfully effective 
government actions: 
Many countries have historically subsidized the use of coal.  The 
United States subsidizes mining and cattle grazing on federal land, and 
sometimes logging and oil drilling as well, not to mention water use.  
Other countries have substantial subsidies for ocean fishing.  
Elimination of such subsidies would improve the environment and save 
money at the same time—not just the federal budget, but for people’s 
real income in the aggregate as well.198 
Another win-win policy move “that would have economic and 
environmental benefits simultaneously would be to remove all barriers 
against international trade in environmental equipment and services, such 
as those involved in renewable energy generation, smokestack scrubbing, 
or waste treatment facilities.”199 
Third, Frankel is skeptical about the school of thought that virtually 
any “tightening of environmental regulation stimulates technological 
                                                     
 194. Id.  He claims, in this regard, that “[d]ifferentiated CAFE standards for vehicles, for 
example, probably encouraged the birth of the SUV craze.”  Id. (parenthesis omitted). 
 195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  This is because, as Frankel clearly explains, 
“[g]overnment mandates regarding what specific technologies firms must use . . . deny firms the 
flexibility to find better ways to achieve a given goal.”  Id. (parenthesis omitted). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 198. Id.  As Frankel candidly admits, however, politics often runs roughshod over economics: 
“Admittedly the economists’ approach—taxing gasoline or making ranchers pay for grazing rights—
is often extremely unpopular politically.”  Id. 
 199. Id. at 137–38.  As explained by Frankel, this policy measure would result in a “double 
payoff” involving “the growth-enhancing effect of elimination of barriers to exports (in a sector 
where the United States is likely to be able to develop a comparative advantage), together with the 
environment-enhancing effect of facilitating imports of the inputs that go into environmental 
protection.”  Id. at 138.  A “precedent,” in this regard, according to Frankel, “is the removal of 
barriers to the imports of fuel-efficient cars from Japan, which was a clear case of simultaneously 
promoting free trade and clean air.”  Id. 
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innovation and thereby has positive effects on both the economy and the 
environment.”  This hypothesis seems to assume, in Frankel’s eyes, that 
wise, well-crafted government interventions in an economy are not 
important.200 
3. Effects of Openness to Trade 
Professor Frankel elegantly instructs us that some effects of trade on 
the environment come about through economic growth and some effects 
of trade on the environment occur even for a given level of income.201  
As to the former, more open trade “tends to raise income,” and 
contributes to a society’s economic growth.202  This, in turn, through 
operation of the Kuznets Curve, has a favorable impact on environmental 
quality over time.203  With respect to the latter, “effects of trade that do 
not operate via economic growth,” Frankel indicates that “[t]hey can be 
classified in three categories: [1] systemwide effects that are adverse, [2] 
systemwide effects that are beneficial, and [3] effects that vary across 
countries depending on local competitive advantage.”204  First, regarding 
systemwide bad effects, Frankel labels this classification as the “race to 
the bottom hypothesis.”205  He summarizes this concern as follows: “[T]o 
the extent that countries are open to international trade and investment, 
environmental standards will be lower than they would otherwise be” 
because of concerns by political interest groups, like industry and labor, 
“that they will lose competitiveness against firms in other 
[environmentally lax] countries” if firms are saddled with costly 
environmental regulations.206 
Second, regarding systemwide good effects, Frankel labels this 
classification the “gains from trade hypothesis.”207  He explains this 
supposition as follows: “Trade allows countries to attain more of what 
they want, which includes environmental goods in addition to market-
measured output.”208  This overall positive influence might come about 
                                                     
 200. Id.  This school of thought is closely associated with economist Michael Porter, and is, 
therefore, called the Porter Hypothesis.  See id. (citing Porter and calling the school of thought the 
Porter Hypothesis). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 138–39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205. Id. at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at 140. 
 208. Id. 
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through openness encouraging ongoing “technological and managerial 
innovation,” as well as “an international ratcheting up of environmental 
standards”209 spurred on by powerful international environmental 
standard-setters like the United States. 
Third, with respect to differential effects arising from comparative 
advantage, Frankel refers to “[a]n oft-expressed concern . . . that, to the 
extent that countries are open to international trade and investment, some 
will specialize in producing dirty products, and export them to other 
countries.”210  As he goes on to explain: 
The prediction is that the environment will be damaged more in this set 
of countries, as compared to what would happen without trade.  The 
environment will be cleaner in the second set of countries, those that 
specialize in clean production and instead import the dirty products 
from the other countries.  Leaving aside the possibility of a race to the 
bottom effect, the worldwide environment on average might even 
benefit somewhat, just as aggregate output should benefit, because of 
the gains from trade.  But not everyone would approve of such a 
bargain.211 
4. Potential Conflicts Between Globalization and Environmental 
Regulation 
Professor Frankel lucidly examines the so-called race to the bottom 
hypothesis in this portion of his essay.  While he acknowledges that the 
“phenomenon can potentially put downward pressure on the regulatory 
standards of countries that compete internationally in trade and 
investment,” the race to the bottom hypothesis “leaves much out.”212  
Initially, “is the point that, for most of us, environmental quality is one 
goal, but not the only goal,” since “we care also about income, and trade 
is one means of promoting economic growth” so these “goals often need 
to be balanced against each other.”213  Second, “[e]nvironmental 
concerns can be an excuse for protectionism,” which can result in “less 
growth in trade and income” and “not even necessarily end up with a 
better environment.”214  Third, because foreign exporting firms are 
typically not “at the table” of national domestic policymaking, 
“environmental polices that are adopted on average can discriminate 
                                                     
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 143. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 145. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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against foreign firms relative to domestic firms, without anyone ever 
deliberately having supported a measure out of protectionist intent.”215  
This structuralist problem is illustrated by Frankel in the Genetically 
Modified Organisms (GMO) agricultural dispute between the exporting 
firms of the United States and the importing countries of the European 
Union.  Frankel provides useful and practical insight when he urges: 
 Whatever the source of different perceptions [regarding the 
environment] across countries, it is important to have a set of 
internationally agreed rules to govern trade, and if possible a 
mechanism for settling disputes that arise.  That is the role of the WTO.  
The need for such an institution does not vanish when environmental 
issues are a part of the dispute.  Certainly if one cares at all about trade 
and growth, then one cannot automatically sign on to each and every 
campaign seeking to block trade on environmental grounds.  But even 
if one cares solely about the environment, claims need to be evaluated 
through some sort of neutral process.216 
5. International Agreements and Institutions 
Professor Frankel completes his perspicacious think piece with some 
helpful observations and recommendations.  On the topic of multilateral 
environmental organizations, he offers a wide-eyed-realist take that 
“there is very little support among the world’s governments for a 
powerful multilateral agency in the area of the environment” because 
“[t]hey fear infringement on their sovereignty.”217  On the topic of 
bilateral and regional fair trade agreements (FTAs), he observes that 
these more limited types of international undertakings “have 
incorporated environmental components more often than have 
multilateral agreements.”218  Frankel sees a pragmatic reason for this 
phenomenon: “Whether because of cultural homogeneity or the small 
numbers involved, a group consisting of a few neighbors is usually 
readier to contemplate the sort of deep integration required for 
harmonization of environmental standards than are negotiators in groups 
with more than 100 diverse members, such as the WTO.”219  And on the 
                                                     
 215. Id. at 146. 
 216. Id. at 146–47.  Frankel also argues for an internationalist approach with regard to global 
environmental problems like carbon dioxide emissions, loss of biodiversity, depletion of the 
stratospheric ozone shield, sulfur dioxide emissions leading to acid rain, and other concerns. 
Id. at 150. 
 217. Id. at 151. 
 218. Id. at 152. 
 219. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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topic of WTO panel rulings, Frankel points out that the 
environmentalists’ “[p]erceptions that [these] . . . rulings have interfered 
with the ability of individual countries to pursue environmental goals are 
poorly informed.”220  As he notes: 
In cases such as Canadian asbestos, Venezuelan gasoline, and Asian 
shrimp, the rulings have confirmed that countries can enact 
environmental measures, even if they affect trade and even if they 
concern others’ Processes and Production Methods (PPMs), provided 
the measures do not unnecessarily discriminate among producer 
countries.221 
C. Kent Jones’s Call for Long-Sighted Institutional and Cooperative 
Environmental Globalization 
Professor Kent Jones, in his succinct and tightly reasoned book, 
Who’s Afraid of the WTO?,222 provides a cool-headed response to the 
misinformed and exaggerated protests leveled against the WTO, in 
particular, and globalization, in general.  In a series of informative and 
persuasive chapters leading up to his ultimate conclusion and set of 
twelve recommendations,223 Jones covers much ground.  He analyzes 
such timely topics as: why countries trade and join the WTO;224 the 
nature of trade protectionism;225 the WTO and its interface with national 
sovereignty;226 human rights, labor concerns, and trade;227 developing 
countries and trade;228 and NGOs, MNCs, and trade.229  His chapter on 
trade and the environment230 is particularly clearheaded and will be the 
focus of my discussion in the remaining section of this Part of the 
Article.  But before exploring Jones’s chapter on trade and 
environmental dynamics, a brief synopsis of his more general, contextual 
exegesis about the WTO is in order. 
                                                     
 220. Id. at 160. 
 221. Id. 
 222. KENT JONES, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE WTO? (2004). 
 223. Id. at 186–201. 
 224. Id. at 33–47. 
 225. Id. at 48–65. 
 226. Id. at 92–104. 
 227. Id. at 125–46. 
 228. Id. at 147–66. 
 229. Id. at 167–85. 
 230. Id. at 105–24. 
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1. Why the WTO Is Under Fire 
According to Jones, “[i]t is ironic that the WTO, with nearly 
universal membership and a strong consensus on the benefits of trade, 
should generate such [extraordinary] controversy.”231  As he explains: 
 All of the recent turmoil surrounding the WTO contrasts sharply 
with the staid image of multilateral trade diplomacy in general and a 
history of trade negotiations played out in relative obscurity.  The 
organization was established in 1995 as part of the set of agreements 
reached in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations that had begun in 
1986.  The WTO’s predecessor was the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), founded in 1947 as part of a new postwar economic 
order that also included the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund.  Over the next [five decades], the GATT sponsored eight rounds 
of trade negotiations that reduced average industrial tariffs among its 
members from 40 percent to just 3 percent.  The GATT began with just 
twenty-nine members . . . including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, other European countries, Canada, and a small number of 
developing countries.  Its membership grew to 131 countries by the end 
of the Uruguay Round, and the WTO as of 2003 included 146 member 
countries.232 
Professor Jones points out that the WTO has become “a lightning 
rod” for “anxieties and fears” concerning globalization.233  Although 
“global trade policy rules can coexist with and reinforce social and 
environmental goals,” Jones contends that “an expanded set of 
international agreements” and “new global institutions” will be required 
to reconcile trade, the environment, and other social aspirations.234 
Engaging in a fascinating taxonomical exercise, Professor Jones 
differentiates between what he calls “WTO bashers,” on the one hand, 
and “WTO skeptics” on the other hand.235  The former, says Jones, “tend 
                                                     
 231. Id. at 4. 
 232. Id.  Jones informs us that the WTO is a limited organization with little flexibility: 
  The WTO is an organization based on a consensus among its members that countries 
benefit from trading with each other, and the members are therefore willing to promote 
trade through multilateral negotiations and a system of trade policy rules and dispute 
settlement.  Only governments can be members of the WTO, and all of the rules, 
negotiations, and procedures are driven by consensus: no rights or obligations can accrue 
to any member country without the implicit agreement of the entire membership.  This 
principle keeps the organization focused on the one issue that forms the basis of that 
consensus: the mutual gains from trade. 
Id. 
 233. Id. at 5. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
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to be ideologically opposed to capitalism and therefore see irreconcilable 
conflicts between human rights, social justice, and the global 
environment . . . and a market-driven trading system . . . .  For them, it 
seems, the conflict over the WTO is akin to a struggle of good versus 
evil, with no compromise possible.”236 
The “WTO skeptics,” however, 
are in principle concerned about the impact of globalized markets on 
their jobs and the state of the world, and they question the role of the 
WTO in a world of multidimensional issues and problems.  They fall 
into a number of different groups, based on both economic and non-
economic interests and priorities.  Some, for example, are worried 
about losing their jobs as a result of international competition; others 
own factories and capital assets threatened by imports.  Still others see 
the profit motive associated with international trade as a dangerous 
force that is being allowed to override environmental and social 
concerns.237 
Jones makes another vital point in his discussion of sovereignty; he 
makes a distinction between multilateral conceptions of fair trade versus 
unilateral conceptions.  He argues that, as a fundamental matter, “a 
global trading system must rest on a multilateral, not a unilateral, notion 
of what is fair, unless one dominant country or group of countries can 
call the shots and force the others to follow.”238  As Jones sees it, 
“[m]orally based unilateral trade sanctions represent a slippery slope in 
trade policy because all countries can find moral flaws in the policies of 
other countries if they look hard enough.”239  As he recommends: “[w]hat 
is needed is a way to identify compelling global policy issues on the 
basis of broad consensus, scientific evidence where applicable, and 
systematic, coordinated action.”240  Furthermore, “[t]wo additional 
objections to unilateral action are that such measures will either be 
ineffective, weakening the credibility and resolve of countries to address 
the issue systematically, or if they are effective, that they will do more 
harm than good.”241  Thus, Jones persuasively contends, in this regard, 
that 
                                                     
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 98. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 98–99. 
 241. Id. at 99. 
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[t]he Law of Unintended Consequences would often intervene.  Thus, 
attempts to eliminate poverty by enforcing a worldwide minimum wage 
with trade restrictions would most likely increase unemployment and 
poverty.  A trade ban on goods made with child labor may very well 
increase child prostitution.  Environmental antidumping regulations 
that prevent poor countries from exporting certain goods would 
typically reduce economic growth and possibly lead to greater 
deforestation as alternative fuels are no longer affordable.242 
2. Trade Policy and the Environment 
Professor Jones observes that “[m]uch of the emotional opposition to 
the WTO in recent years has been fueled by the view that it is essentially 
an antienvironmental organization.”243  Yet, “[a]ll is not as it appears to 
be” because “[a]side from the wildly exaggerated perception of the WTO 
as an unelected world government, imposing the will of multinational 
corporate polluters on the world’s population, there is widespread 
misunderstanding about the [alleged negative] relationship between trade 
and the environment.”244  Jones emphasizes, in this regard, “green 
language” in the 1994 press release, which the WTO issued near the time 
of its founding.245  He seems a bit defensive—and decidedly 
unpragmatic—however, when he argues: 
The [WTO’s] Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE), for its 
part, has provided a valuable forum for discussions on reconciling 
environmental and WTO treaty obligations and other crossover issues.  
However, it has not produced concrete proposals for trade policy 
reform to enforce or promote environmental goals because it has no 
institutional mandate to do so.246 
But why can’t the WTO’s CTE exercise some leadership in the 
difficult area of trade and the environment where it has expertise and 
prestige?  While it may be true, as Jones asserts, that current “trade-and-
environment policy issues go beyond the limits of an identifiable 
                                                     
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 105. 
 244. Id. at 106. 
 245. Id.  Jones quotes from a 1994 press release issued by the WTO, which stated: “‘[T]here 
should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction between upholding and safeguarding an open, 
non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the 
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development on the other.’”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Press Release, World Trade Organization, The Structure and 
Organization of Work During the Transition from the GATT to the WTO (June 24, 1994)). 
 246. Id. at 107. 
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[present] WTO consensus,”247 why does the CTE not try harder and 
attempt to be an honest broker in proposing to WTO member states rules 
and guidelines for heading off disputes before they reach the claim and 
arbitration stage?  Why wait for other international “processes and 
institutions to resolve conflicts between trade and environmental 
goals”248 when the future is now?  On this point, the logic of such 
scholars as Carlos A. Calderin and Sanford E. Gaines—both of whom 
resist the formation of a world environmental organization to “solve” the 
disconnects between trade and environmental issues249—is more 
pragmatic than Jones’s attempt to engineer an end run around the real 
world complexity of the trade-environment problem.  As explained by 
Gaines, “[t]he existence of a [Global Environmental Organization (GEO) 
or its functional equivalent] seems . . . more likely to allow the WTO to 
continue to avoid trade policy reform by pushing governance 
responsibility off onto the environmental community.”250  Rather, 
according to Gaines, “[t]he remedy for that problem is an organized 
effort to educate trade policy makers and institutional and organizational 
arrangements that keep the pressure on the WTO to make suitable policy 
changes.”251 
Professor Jones’s discussion of the dispute resolution dynamic of the 
WTO gets back to a pragmatic tack after his mushy thinking about the 
need for a separate GEO.  After briefly discussing some of the more 
celebrated recent WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) decisions, like 
the tuna/dolphin controversy and the shrimp/turtle disagreement, Jones 
points out that, “[i]n general, political confrontation over the WTO can 
often be avoided by identifying common sense alternative measures to 
                                                     
 247. Id. at 108. 
 248. Id. 
 249. See Gaines, supra note 95, at 342–85 (arguing that a global environmental organization 
would be ineffective).  See generally Charles A. Calderin, The Emergence of a Responsible Green 
World Trade Organization: Why Creating a World Environment Organization Would Hinder This 
Goal, 8 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35 (2002) (arguing that a world environment organization 
would not protect and preserve the environment). 
 250. Gaines, supra note 95, at 377. 
 251. Id.  Professor Gaines offers several steps of “bridge-building” between trade officials and 
the environmental community.  Id. at 380–82.  Regarding the potential utility of the WTO’s CTE, 
Gaines asserts: 
Already, the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment provides a ready occasion for . 
. . involvement [of environmental officials into the trade policy deliberation process].  
More and more governments are bringing their environmental officials to the table at the 
CTE, and the WTO has accredited a number of international environmental organizations 
as observers at the CTE meetings, and has invited them to speak on occasion. 
Id. at 380. 
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defuse or resolve the underlying conflict”252 in a cost-effective and 
reasonable manner.  Jones’s commentary on the beef-hormone dispute 
and the precautionary principle is, likewise, practical and insightful.  As 
he explains, “[t]he European Union had banned the import of U.S. 
hormone-treated beef, and the United States had argued that such 
hormones were safe and left no damaging effect.”253  The United States 
won on this legal issue before the WTO.254  According to Jones’s 
balanced and judicious analysis of the beef-hormone controversy: 
There is an important principle at stake in the decision: in the absence 
of scientific evidence, should countries be allowed to use a 
precautionary principle to exclude imports at their discretion?  The 
clear danger is that much mischief could result if WTO rules were 
rewritten to allow countries unilaterally to restrict imports based on the 
perception that something is amiss in the way the imports were 
produced.  Instead of unilaterally invoking a precautionary principle, 
assembling an international panel of experts to judge the merits of such 
cases would be far more credible.  This may not be easy if the issue has 
become politicized.  However, the point is that unilateral declarations 
of scientific judgment without supporting evidence will never be a 
viable principle in any rules-based system.255 
The chief reason why Jones’s analysis of trade and environment 
issues is so lucid and concrete is his astute observation that there are 
usually “ways to resolve the issues without resorting to trade restrictions 
or a general assault on the world trading system.”256  As he pragmatically 
summarizes: 
Depending on the situation, countries can often avoid trade conflicts by 
revising their environmental legislation to eliminate discriminatory 
trade effects, by providing foreign aid or technical expertise to 
countries where the environmental problem exists, by negotiating a 
                                                     
 252. JONES, supra note 222, at 110. 
 253. Id. at 111. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 111–12.  Jones cuts through the knot of the beef-hormone controversy with the 
following practical prescription: 
  It seems that suspicions regarding hormone-treated beef have some popular support in 
Europe, encouraged in no small part by European beef producers.  Yet if this is the main 
reason for the government’s import ban, then an equally effective policy would be to 
allow the imports but to require a label on the beef in question stating the use of 
hormones in the cattle.  In this manner, the consumer would ultimately be able to decide, 
at least until such time that any strong scientific evidence provides the basis for stricter 
regulation. 
Id. at 112 (endnote omitted). 
 256. Id. at 117. 
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system of labeling for the products, or by setting up environmental 
codes of conduct for multinational corporations.257 
Moreover, Jones is optimistic about solving international 
environmental disagreements between nation-states because of the value 
of liberalized trade to all trading partners.  As he explains, “instead of 
using trade primarily as a weapon to force compliance with 
environmental measures, the institutional approach suggests the value of 
trade as a positive incentive to induce voluntary compliance” with 
multinational environmental norms.258  “In other words,” according to 
Jones, “global environmental protection will require further trade 
liberalization.”259  Indeed, “the WTO may yet emerge as an important 
component in the process, not through the imposition of an 
environmental chapter, but through its ability to harness the gains from 
trade as a positive bargaining chip for achieving globally acceptable 
environmental goals.”260  The vital “point in this regard is that a 
cooperative approach is likely to produce more progress than 
confrontation, threats, and punishment.”261 
IV. SOME PRINCIPLES OF GLOBOECOPRAGMATISM 
We have examined the differing views of six prominent writers on 
globalization, in general, and on international trade and environment 
conflicts, in particular. 262  Now, it is time to synthesize these views into 
what I call principles of globoecopragmatism: a practical, trade-
enhancing, environmentally protective legal strategy.  In the course of 
                                                     
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 121. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 124.  Professor Jones emphasizes the details of a cooperative international approach 
to trade and environment disputes as follows: 
There are many, many ways in which global environmental goals can be pursued without 
the use of trade sanctions.  Aside from pursuing institutional solutions, through 
international treaties, conventions, and organizations, foreign aid, and technological 
assistance, countries are free to impose nondiscriminatory environmental regulations, 
laws, and taxes on products based on their content and on the impact of their 
consumption.  Trade and environmental goals are, furthermore, not only compatible but 
in many ways complementary.  Trade contributes to economic efficiency, welfare, and 
growth, which together contribute to the resource base necessary for the pursuit of 
environmental objectives both domestically and globally.  Trade also fosters economic 
cooperation, which can serve as a springboard for agreement on the environment and in 
other areas. 
Id. at 123–24. 
 262. See supra notes 4–261 and accompanying text. 
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formulating these principles of globoecopragmatism, I will take the 
liberty of drawing upon a few additional texts. 
A. The Funnel of Pragmatism on Global Trade and the Environment 
As Professor Daniel Farber so eloquently put it: “One of the lessons 
of pragmatism is the usefulness of combining concrete examples with 
more abstract forms of reasoning.”263  Farber points out in this regard: 
Consideration of concrete situations serves several purposes.  It 
provides a method of testing and refining ethical principles.  For 
instance, according to John Rawls, the best moral reasoning involves a 
movement between general theories and intuitions about specific 
issues.  The general theories are tested for their fit with specific 
intuitions, which are themselves subject to modification if they cannot 
be made part of some coherent theory.264 
Indeed, in a similar fashion to Farber’s insights, Professors William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett offer a 
pragmatic approach to the task of statutory interpretation, which can also 
help to shed some light on a pragmatic approach to trade and 
environmental issues.  They contend that “our intellectual framework is 
not single-minded, but consists of a ‘web of beliefs,’ interconnected but 
reflecting different understandings and values.”265  Thus, “[a]s a 
consequence, human decisionmaking tends to be polycentric, spiral, and 
inductive, not unidimensional, linear, and deductive.”266  Eskridge, 
Frickey, and Garrett cite the writings of one of the founders of American 
pragmatism, Charles Peirce,267 for the metaphor that pragmatic reasoning 
                                                     
 263. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 15 (1999) (emphasis added).  Farber then cites to 
John Rawls, id., and quotes another legal theorist for the supporting proposition that “practical 
reason seems always to involve a combination of something general with something specific so that 
judgment mediates between the general standard and the particular case.”  Id. n.2 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (punctuation modified) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 
Term—Foreward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1986)). 
 264. Id. at 15. 
 265. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 240 (2000). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See, e.g., CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF 
RIGHT THINKING (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1997) (containing Peirce’s manuscripts for lectures on 
pragmatism).  See generally CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, PEIRCE (discussing Peirce’s philosophical 
views and how those topics fit together as a whole). “The term ‘pragmatism’ was introduced into the 
discourse of philosophers by Charles Sanders Peirce in 1878, to express a complex of ideas about 
logic (good thinking) which he had developed since 1867.”  John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical 
Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 31 (Jules 
Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
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should not be like a chain (no stronger than its weakest link) but, rather, 
should be like a cable of interconnected fibers;268 thus, they conclude that 
“the goals of statutory interpretation may be multiple and the sources 
may be various.”269 
We can draw upon the Eskridge-Frickey-Garrett methodology and 
the Farber insights about pragmatic legal reasoning270 to play off 
relatively concrete considerations with relatively abstract considerations 
involving global trade and the environment.  The result of this analogical 
analysis coupled with a synthesis of the thoughts explored in Parts II and 
III of this Article is the following “funnel.”271 
 
                                                     
 268. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 265, at 240 (citation omitted). 
 269. Id. 
 270. See supra notes 263–69 and accompanying text. 
 271. I credit Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett for inspiring the use of this funnel of 
pragmatism.  For statutory interpretation techniques, see the “Frickey and Eskridge Funnel of 
Abstraction.”  See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 265, at 241 (incorporating a diagram 
from William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 
42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345–62 (1990)).  I view the Blomquist Funnel of Pragmatism on Global Trade 
and the Environment to be a useful way to play off relatively concrete considerations with relatively 
abstract considerations.  This is a Rawlsian and a Farberian insight of pragmatism.  See supra notes 
263–64 and accompanying text.  Professor Jim Chen, however, has suggested that—unlike the 
Eskridge-Frickey funnel of abstraction for statutory interpretation techniques—the Blomquist Funnel 
of Pragmatism on Global Trade and the Environment is different from “the hydraulic relationship 
between authority and cogency, that informed [the Eskridge-Frickey] project.”  E-mail from Jim 
Chen, Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of Law, University of 
Minnesota Law School, to Robert F. Blomquist, Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of 
Law (Jan. 12, 2006, 16:26 CST) (on file with author).  I concede that there is not a perfect theoretical 
fit between the Eskridge-Frickey funnel of abstraction for statutory interpretation techniques and the 
Blomquist Funnel of Pragmatism on Global Trade and the Environment.  I view the Eskridge-
Frickey funnel to be an inspiring and edifying metaphor for my own funnel. 
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B. Key Pragmatic Principles 
Our analysis and synthesis yields seventeen pragmatic principles for 
approaching problems of global trade and the environment on a “funnel” 
of pragmatism—ranging from the most concrete inquiry to the most 
abstract inquiry.272  What follows is a brief explanation of these 
principles starting at the tip of the funnel (most concrete) and working up 
to the upper cone of the funnel (most abstract). 
                                                     
 272. See supra notes 262–71 and accompanying text (discussing the funnel of pragmatism). 
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1. Minimize Trade Barriers/Maximize Economic Benefit 
The most concrete principle is all about the well-documented 
macroeconomic and microeconomic gains in income from increased 
levels of trade (based on the doctrine of comparative advantage and 
specialization of production) linked with the inverse relationship between 
lower trade barriers and higher levels of trade and further concatenated 
with the Environmental Kuznet Curve (demonstrating steady 
environmental improvement of most pollutant emissions after a society 
reaches a minimal level of per capita income).273  Thus, the opening 
gambit in the globoecopragmatism project should be tariff slashing and 
nontariff trade-barrier-busting proposals by trade negotiators.  A worthy 
example of this point is the offer by U.S. Trade Representative Rob 
Portman and U.S. Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns in October of 
2005 to slash developed-nation farm subsidies as part of the Doha Round 
of WTO negotiations.274 
2. Accelerate Bilateral and Regional FTAs 
Moving up the funnel of pragmatism on global trade and the 
environment, nations should seek as many bilateral and regional FTAs 
that incorporate environmentally protective commitments as are feasible 
and prudent.  The relatively small numbers of international trade partners 
and the relatively more homogenous cultural context make negotiation of 
                                                     
 273. See supra notes 31–32, 38–39, 45–46, 48–50, 183–89, 197–99, 249–51 and accompanying 
text (discussing the relationship between the economy and the environment). 
 274. Stephen J. Norton, WTO Talks Get a Jolt from U.S. Challenge, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY 2822, 
2822 (2005).  Thus: 
  Just weeks ahead of a high-level December [2005] meeting in Hong Kong [of WTO 
national representatives], U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman and Agriculture 
Secretary Mike Johanns on [October] 10 offered to cut price supports for U.S. farmers by 
60 percent, eliminate export subsidies and limit tariffs on some protected products, such 
as sugar.  . . . 
  In exchange, other countries, many of which have much higher tariffs and subsidies 
than the United States, would have to be just as bold.  The 25-nation European Union, for 
example, would have to cut its far more generous subsidies by 80 percent.  All countries 
would have to shrink tariffs and open their markets to U.S. agriculture goods. 
 
  . . . . 
 
  . . . Industrial countries are under increasing political pressure—as well as the threat 
of costly trade sanctions—from poor nations that say they want a more competitive 
marketplace for agricultural goods. 
Id. 
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these agreements easier than the deep integration demanded by scores of 
diverse nation-states.275  A commendable bilateral FTA with explicit 
environmental standards is the agreement signed between the United 
States and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in October of 2000, and an 
admirable trilateral example is the successful negotiation and agreement 
between Canada, Mexico, and the United States comprising the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its Environmental Side 
Agreement in the early 1990s.276 
3. Develop Cross-Country Environmental Statistics 
Another concrete principle of globoecopragmatism is the advisability 
of developing, utilizing, and refining cross-country environmental 
statistics on how economic growth from freer trade impacts 
environmental objectives.  These comparative data would provide 
quantification of trade-linked environmental benefits and degradations 
that will help policymakers better understand which environmental 
externalities need to be ameliorated.277  It is heartening, for example, that 
existing statistics show that increased international trade flows help 
reduce SO2 emissions.  Conversely, it is disquieting that cross-country 
statistics show that global greenhouse emissions are not moderated by 
international trade.278 
4. Improve National Environmental Enforcement Capacity/Attack 
Corruption 
Still quite concrete as a mode of inquiry and action is the principle 
that pragmatic global trade and environmental policy should improve the 
institutional capacity of relatively poor countries to better enforce their 
own domestic environmental laws in order to diminish national 
externalities, while simultaneously focusing on attacking corruption by 
government officials.279  Regarding government corruption, for instance, 
the Copenhagen Consensus project in 2004 identified this matter as one 
of the most serious problems facing the world today with “world-wide 
                                                     
 275. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text (discussing Frankel’s views on FTAs 
incorporating environmental components). 
 276. See Blomquist, supra note 49, at 751 (discussing these FTAs). 
 277. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text (discussing statistics of environmental 
benefits). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text (discussing need to internalize potential 
externalities). 
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bribery totals at least $1 trillion per year, just over 3 [percent] of the 
world income in 2002.”280 
5. Balance Economic Growth and Environmental Protection Values 
It is decidedly unpragmatic to put zero weight on income that can be 
earned from trade and place an infinite weight on environmental values.  
In many concrete situations involving specific facts, it makes sense to 
fashion policy decisions that are more protective of the environment and 
to require those private firms involved in a particular pattern of trade to 
internalize the environmental protection costs and pass them on to 
importers.  Both economic earnings from expanded trade and 
environmental quality are worthwhile social objectives; we can enjoy a 
combination of both and the true challenge is for policymakers to find 
the best tradeoff.281 
6. Pursue Low-Hanging Fruit 
While it is a bit abstract to urge a search for the most efficient mix of 
trade and environmental policies—the least-costly-most-effective 
measures or “low-hanging fruit”—this mode of inquiry takes on 
concreteness in specific contexts.  Thus, because trade sanctions in the 
service of environmental protection are notoriously economically 
wasteful and often counterproductive, policymakers should consider 
cheaper and more effective ways of achieving environmental objectives.  
By way of two prominent examples: instead of banning hormone-fed 
beef, governments should mandate accurate product labeling so that 
consumers can make their own individual choices of what kind of meat 
to put on their dinner tables; instead of banning fish products caught by 
poor-nation fishermen because the process or method of harvesting fish 
is harmful to other marine life of concern (like dolphins or sea turtles), 
richer nations should provide transfer payments to help the destitute 
fishermen buy the more sophisticated technology.282 
                                                     
 280. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Governance and Corruption, in GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL 
SOLUTIONS, supra note 32, at 301, 301. 
 281. See supra notes 126–32, 165–71, 212–13 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity 
to balance economic earnings from expanded trade and environmental quality). 
 282. See supra notes 27–29, 37–39, 135–39, 143–44, 150–58, 190–96, 200, 220–21, 252–53, 
256–57 and accompanying text (discussing various environmental and trade regulations). 
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7. Adjust Economic Growth Statistics for Environmental Impact 
While the undertaking is abstract at the moment because of our 
relatively crude and inexact methods of measuring environmental 
damages (and cognate ecosystems services),283 we must take more 
vigorous steps to find principled ways of adjusting economic growth 
rates for environmental degradation since unmeasured, environmentally 
destructive growth is simply not an accurate yardstick of human 
flourishing.  Only with improved, focused, and more robust ways of 
gauging environmentally sustainable and environmentally unsustainable 
trade income will we be able to make concrete changes in production 
processes and trading arrangements.284 
8. Green the WTO and Forget About Forming a GEO 
We should work for and embrace further multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) among nations to address continuing unresolved 
global and international environmental spillovers and global resource 
issues.285  At the same time, we should focus efforts on “greening” the 
WTO—a concerted effort to educate trade policymakers and to fashion 
suitable institutional and organizational innovations that moderate trade 
rules to be more protective of environmental concerns.  Dreaming up a 
separate and competing GEO as an end run around the real world 
complexity of the trade-environment problem is too abstract by half.286  
The WTO’s recent efforts in reinvigorating its CTE and in its Appellate 
Body’s turn toward creative resolution of trade and environmental 
conflicts are two examples of concrete efforts to recalibrate the 
equilibrium between these two important concerns.287 
                                                     
 283. See, e.g., FINDLEY ET AL., supra note 139, at 796–801 (collecting and discussing materials 
addressing government recovery for damages for injury to natural resources); id. at 872–81 
(collecting materials that discuss “economic services” of various intact and functioning ecosystems). 
 284. See supra notes 129–30, 170–71 and accompanying text (discussing need for measure of 
environmental impact from economic trade). 
 285. When we pause to assess the record of progress in international environmental treaty-
making over the last four decades, the nations of the world deserve credit for a remarkable number 
of MEAs on a wide array of problems.  See ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW xiii–xxix (1991) (chronological list of MEAs). 
 286. See supra notes 48–50, 249–51 and accompanying text. 
 287. Blomquist, supra note 49, at 743–45, 752. 
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9. Emphasize Facts, Not Grand Theory 
This mode of inquiry for resolving trade and environmental conflicts 
is at the midpoint of our funnel of pragmatism—halfway between the 
most concrete consideration at the tip of the funnel and the most abstract 
consideration at the top of the funnel.  This is the case because this 
factor—emphasizing facts, not grand theory—is equally abstract (what 
does it really mean in the real world?) and concrete (specific cases will 
bring forth the particular facts that we should address).  In a sense, this 
principle is more of an attitude or mood which posits that the most 
fruitful way to approach trade and environmental issues is to withhold, in 
a disciplined fashion, broad-sweeping generalizations while avoiding 
knee-jerk imputations of bad motives and be willing to search for facts 
and insist on precise conceptual thinking.288  For example, Public Citizen 
is at its best when it offers specific criticisms of the Uruguay Round 
tariff schedules that provide counterproductive “incentives for rip and 
ship exploitation of natural resources” and specific objections to the 
content of WTO-led policies that destroy forests.289  Conversely, Public 
Citizen’s generalized trade-bashing rhetoric is of no use in resolving real 
trade and environment problems.290 
10. Beware of Protectionism in the Guise of Environmentalism 
It is a fact of political life that domestic interest groups will try to 
rent-seek and lobby national politicians for as much trade protection as 
they can get.  Therefore, like the classical Greek explorer Odysseus (who 
was an expert at pragmatically coping with his uncertain world),291 we 
need to fashion and improve global legal institutions and mechanisms 
                                                     
 288. See supra notes 56–62, 77–78, 167, 170–71, 178–83 and accompanying text (asserting the 
importance of focused thinking). 
 289. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 291. Judge Richard A. Posner, in a wonderful reflection on Odysseus, writes: 
  [What] is odd about the protagonist, and the implicit values, of the Odyssey from the 
orthodox standpoint is that Odysseus is not a conventional hero, the kind depicted in the 
Iliad.  He is strong, brave, and skillful in fighting, but he is no Achilles . . . or even Ajax; 
and he relies on guile, trickery, and outright deception to a degree inconsistent with what 
we have come to think of as heroism or with its depiction in the Iliad.  His dominant trait 
is skill in coping with his environment rather than ability to impose himself upon it by 
brute force.  He is the most intelligent person in the Odyssey but his intelligence is 
thoroughly practical, adaptive.  Unlike Achilles in the Iliad, who is given to reflection, 
notably about the heroic ethic itself, Odysseus is pragmatic.  He is an instrumental 
reasoner rather than a speculative one. 
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 27 (2003) (all but first emphasis added). 
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that will prevent us from being lured by the Sirens of domestic rent-
seekers onto the rocks of trade protectionism.  The WTO and other trade 
agreements between nation-states provide the functional equivalent of 
Odysseus ordering his compatriots to bind him to the Calypso’s mast in 
the presence of the alluring Sirens: international trade rules, agreed on in 
advance by nation-states, are neutral methods of avoiding the structural 
tendency of domestic business firms to curry favor with domestic 
politicians in exchange for trade discriminatory measures (some subtle, 
some in the guise of protecting the environment, and even some 
unintentional).292  Therefore, we need to cope with the relatively abstract 
matter of domestic rent-seeking and trade protection with relatively 
concrete international trade rules. 
11. Business Pursuit of Organized Learning and Best Practices 
It is somewhat abstract to utilize Environmental Lateral Pressure 
theory—involving the three critical variables of population, technology, 
and resources—to gain the insight that global trade tends to provide an 
unsavory mechanism for rich countries to push off their environmental 
costs of industrialization onto poor countries.293  Yet, it is fairly concrete 
to realize the ways that MNCs can ameliorate this problem.  MNCs 
should seek, and be encouraged to pursue, organized learning and the 
best practices of environmentally protective production measures.294  
This matter would appear to be a tantalizing opportunity for the WTO’s 
CTE to convene conferences, publish sector-specific, environment-best 
practices, and gather statistical data.295 
                                                     
 292. See supra notes 214–16 and accompanying text (explaining how policymakers should not 
give in to protectionist arguments using environmental concerns as an excuse). 
 293. See supra notes 86–102 and accompanying text (discussing the downsides of globalization 
and Lofdahl’s Environmental Lateral Pressure model). 
 294. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text (detailing examples of corporations 
following best practice measures). 
 295. See supra notes 277–78 and accompanying text (commenting on recent statistical evidence 
on the effect of globalization on environmental objectives).  For an industry-specific concrete 
example of arguably best environmental practices in the consumer retail sector, see Michael Barbaro 
& Felicity Barringer, Wal-Mart To Seek Savings In Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at C1 
(reporting Wal-Mart’s chief executive’s announcement of “a set of sweeping, specific environmental 
goals to reduce energy use in its stores, double its trucks’ fuel efficiency, minimize its use of 
packaging and pressure thousands of companies in its worldwide supply chain to follow its lead” and 
that “the nation’s largest retailer is joining the nation’s largest manufacturer, General Electric, in 
pursuing policies that set specific goals for environmental performance, while advertising those 
goals to shareholders and customers and the public as strategic business decisions”). 
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12. International Cooperation in Improving the Human Face of 
Globalization at an Optimal Rate 
The fact is that globalization has a human face: In every part of the 
planet human beings are realizing real economic gains for their work and 
skills in helping to create and deliver goods and services which are 
competitive on a world-class basis.296  Of course, we can do better.  We 
can do better by urging poor countries to diversify their economies into 
multiple labor-intensive industries while avoiding import substitution 
strategies and replacing excessive bureaucracy with competitive 
markets.297  We can do better by seeing that poor countries implement 
virtuous social policies—such as literacy programs and higher education 
initiatives that work in tandem with sensible economic policies to better 
peoples’ lives.298  We can do better by designing institutional 
mechanisms that allow people to cope with the sometimes wrenching 
changes brought on by globalization and by being mindful of the rate of 
optimal policy changes to avoid a worst-case scenario like Russia’s 
attempt to plunge headlong into a free market, globalized economy.299 
The nations of the world can also seek to improve the quantity and 
quality of their multinational cooperation in addressing trade and 
environmental disputes.  Trade sanctions in the name of environmental 
justice should not be anathema.300  Rather, multinational cooperation on 
improving environment impacts of expanded trade should focus on 
technical assistance and foreign aid.  Moreover, countries should be free 
to impose nondiscriminatory environmental rules and taxes on products 
based on the content and negative impact of their mass consumption.301  
Indeed, international cooperation and problem solving is more often than 
not the answer to global environmental issues, not national sovereignty.  
National policies are often the obstacles, not the solutions, to these global 
environmental concerns.302 
                                                     
 296. See supra notes 43–44, 106, 231 and accompanying text (discussing globalization’s 
benefits to humans). 
 297. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing poverty aspects of globalization). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (noting careful steering and optimal speed of 
policy changes are necessary to avoid excessively rapid reforms such as those that devastated 
Russia). 
 300. See supra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (noting that certain trade restrictions would 
likely increase unemployment and poverty and reduce economic growth). 
 301. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of international 
cooperation in achieving environmental goals). 
 302. See supra notes 145–48 (stating national sovereignty is an obstacle in dealing with 
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This principle—optimally improving the human face of globalization 
through international cooperation—is abstract in large measure.  Still, 
there are specific policies that the international community can pursue, as 
discussed above, to ameliorate trade and the environment disconnects. 
13. Blue and Green Canons 
At this point on our funnel of pragmatism the modes of inquiry are 
very abstract in nature.  WTO dispute panels—as well as bilateral or 
regional trade agreement dispute tribunals—should utilize a “blue canon” 
of construction as the basic legal standard.  A blue canon of construction 
calls for as much unrestricted free trade as is reasonably feasible.  A blue 
canon of construction—inspired by the blue image of the borderless earth 
floating in space when viewed from afar—should be the predominant 
standard of review.  Yet, because of the vital importance of 
environmentally protective laws, international trade dispute bodies 
should concomitantly interpret national and international environmental 
laws that attempt to restrict free trade to allow as much environmental 
protection as is reasonably feasible.303 
14. Employ a Limited and Nuanced Precautionary Principle 
While the precautionary principle of environmental law is, in 
general, a worthwhile idea, the devil is in the details.  The international 
community should not allow this principle—in the absence of good 
scientific evidence—to be used by nations, at their sole discretion, to 
exclude imports.  Instead of countenancing unilateral invocation of the 
precautionary principle by an importing country, we should insist that an 
international panel of experts judge the merits of a purported importing 
nation’s trade barrier precautionary standard.304  In a related way, we 
should limit the precautionary principle by a reasonable sense of 
causation that reflects nuance and proportionality.305 
                                                                                                                                  
environmental issues and that international cooperation is necessary). 
 303. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that a “green” canon of interpretation 
would urge WTO panel members to construe competing environmental laws as allowing as much 
environmental protection as is reasonable). 
 304. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text (noting that unilateral declarations of 
scientific judgment without supporting evidence will never be a viable principle in a rules-based 
system). 
 305. See supra notes 4–32 and accompanying text (discussing Peter Singer’s call for “an ethical 
perspective on globalization” and arguing that it lacks nuance and proportionality); see also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 109–28 (2005) (discussing 
how to reconstruct the precautionary principle and manage fear). 
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15. Trade Dispute Tribunals Should Seek Constant Improvement in 
Their Legal Processes 
It is an extremely abstract principle to urge constant improvement in 
legal processes.  And yet, the very pragmatic, late Harvard law 
professors, Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, emphasized the 
social importance of “constant improvement of all of the procedures” 
which seek to advance “institutional settlement.”306  That is, that 
“regularized and peaceable methods of discussion . . . ought to be 
accepted as binding upon the whole society unless and until they are duly 
changed.”307  Moreover, the very practical Japanese have a concept—
kaizen—which means constant improvement; kaizen has been touted by 
Japanese business theorists as a vital credo for organizational success.308  
So the WTO and other international trade tribunals should follow the 
good, albeit abstract, advice of Professors Hart and Sacks and Japanese 
business thinkers in pursuing constant improvement in the legal 
processes by which trade and environment disputes are resolved and 
institutionally settled. 
Still, there are some concrete actions that can serve to leaven this 
principle.  The WTO (and other international trade tribunals) should (1) 
seek to broaden the expertise of its trade arbitrators to encompass 
individuals with expertise in environmental, health, and safety, (2) 
expand panel consultations with international law experts and 
environmental experts, (3) tighten conflict of interest standards for trade 
arbitrators, (4) open up trade disputes to amicus input, and (5) consider a 
supreme trade dispute body and final appeals to the World Court by way 
of discretionary review.309 
16. Appreciate Complexity and Uncertainty 
While extremely abstract in nature, it is useful for those involved in 
global trade and environment issues to appreciate the complex and often 
uncertain nature of the beast.  We should insist that these important 
matters be subject to systematic and comprehensive analysis.  And yet, 
                                                     
 306. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 6 (tent. ed. 1958). 
 307. Id. at 4. 
 308. See generally MASAAKI IMAI, KAIZEN: THE KEY TO JAPAN’S COMPETITIVE SUCCESS (1986) 
(discussing the concept of kaizen). 
 309. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing suggested methods for WTO 
reformation). 
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we should understand and appreciate that proposed solutions can have 
second-order and feedback consequences.310 
17. Tolerate Philosophical Lifestyle Differences 
Most abstract of all on our funnel of pragmatism, is the principle that 
we should tolerate philosophical lifestyle differences which lead to 
varying perspectives on the value of globalization.  Environmentalists 
will tend to value environment over income; trade economists and 
businesspersons will tend to value income over environment.311  While it 
is probably a pipe dream to expect ideological trade bashers to reconcile 
with ideological environmental bashers,312 we can hope that more 
moderate skeptics of the other camp will continue to sit down with their 
opponents and bargain in good faith about potential win-win solutions. 
In seeking to gain wisdom from this principle we should be attuned 
to what Professor Pierre Schlag calls a “perspectivist aesthetic”:313 
[T]he identities of law and laws mutate in relation to point of view.  As 
the frame, context, perspective, or position of the actor or observer 
shifts, both fact and law come to have different identities.  Accordingly, 
the social or political identity of the legal actor or observer becomes the 
crucial situs of law and legal inquiry.314 
And so, it should come as no surprise that those economic interest 
groups that stand to be jolted, disrupted, and threatened by more 
liberalized free-trade proposals will attempt to protect their interests and 
fight back with whatever rhetorical and legal arguments seem 
plausible—including environmental rhetoric about how the proposed 
trade liberalization will detrimentally impact some “green” value.  The 
pragmatic challenge, therefore, of the principle of toleration is to break 
the impasse of perspectives between free traders and environmentalists.  
Schlag offers a way of pragmatically breaking the logjam of dueling 
perspectives through what I have characterized as an “optimistic 
disassociative aesthetic.”315  As Schlag describes this aesthetic: 
                                                     
 310. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing characterizations of a pragmatic 
approach to trade and environment problems). 
 311. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in philosophical 
thought between economists and environmentalists). 
 312. See supra notes 235–37 and accompanying text (distinguishing the no-compromise attitude 
of WTO bashers with the more moderate attitude of WTO skeptics). 
 313. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1051–52 (2002). 
 314. Id. at 1052. 
 315. Blomquist, supra note 158, at 504. 
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[T]o appreciate the ways in which legal identities can collapse into a 
multitude of associations allows the advocate or judge to reconstruct 
those identities in desired ways.  This breakdown and reconstruction is 
perhaps the most intense aesthetic moment in law—the point at which 
the legal professional is creating law.316 
We might place the recent sage observation of Gene Sperling—a 
former top economic advisor to President Bill Clinton—into the rubric of 
an optimistic disassociative aesthetic.  Offering comments that describe a 
potential explanation for both the collapse of WTO trade negotiations in 
Seattle in 1999 (with environmentalists’ protests being a key driver of 
the collapse) and the November 2005 stall in trade negotiations under the 
Doha round of trade talks (with farmers’ concerns being the main 
sticking point), Sperling explained that government negotiators of trade-
opening pacts must learn to see things from the perspective of those 
whose “lives and jobs are disrupted by more open trade.”317  In words 
that are a useful capstone to the pragmatic principle of toleration 
Sperling asserts: 
 If you care about progress in market opening, you are going to have 
to have more ambitious compacts for sharing the downside costs as 
well as the benefits of open trade . . . .  As economists, we talk about 
how the benefits of lower prices are broadly shared.  But the costs are 
very heavily concentrated.318 
V. CONCLUSION 
Through an analysis of three important environmental critics of 
globalization (Peter Singer’s ethical jeremiad,319 Public Citizen’s 
political frontal attack,320 and Corey Lofdahl’s systems critique321) 
coupled with an investigation of three prominent environmental optimists 
of globalization (Jagdish Bhagwati’s plea to cope with and improve 
globalization,322 Jeffrey Frankel’s upbeat view on three ways that 
globalization can be good for the environment,323 and Kent Jones’s call 
for long-sighted institutional and cooperative environmental 
                                                     
 316. Schlag, supra note 313, at 1098 (emphasis added). 
 317. Edmund L. Andrews, Farm Issues Stall Talks For a Deal On Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2005, at C1. 
 318. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 319. See supra Part II.A. 
 320. See supra Part II.B. 
 321. See supra Part II.C. 
 322. See supra Part III.A. 
 323. See supra Part III.B. 
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globalization324), we have discerned a hodgepodge of useful and not so 
useful ways to think about trade and the environment.  Inspired by the 
model developed by William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and 
Elizabeth Garrett of a “funnel of abstraction”—which charts a variety of 
key principles or modes of inquiry when interpreting statutes325—and 
stimulated by the writings of Daniel A. Farber on eco-pragmatism,326 I 
have developed my own “funnel of pragmatism on global trade and the 
environment.”  My funnel of pragmatism consists of seventeen principles 
or modes of inquiry—distilled from the writings of the six thinkers on 
trade and the environment in Parts II and III of my Article and leavened 
by other perspectives—with the most concrete factors at or near the tip of 
the funnel and the most abstract factors at or near the lip of the funnel.327  
I have argued that in thinking about issues of global trade and the 
environment, the most pragmatic and fruitful way to proceed is through a 
polycentric consideration of both abstract and concrete principles.328  By 
pondering something general and something specific on trade and the 
environment issues, we can learn to exercise better judgment—call it 
globoecopragmatism—that will reflect both general standards and factual 
specifics.  In this way, perhaps, we can make further progress in 
simultaneously opening global markets and protecting the earth’s 
environments. 
 
                                                     
 324. See supra Part III.C. 
 325. See supra notes 265–71 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text; see also BRYAN G. NORTON, SEARCHING 
FOR SUSTAINABILITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 9–104 (2003) (discussing pragmatism as an environmental philosophy); THE 
JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Jim Chen ed., 2003) (compiling a series of essays based on the eco-
pragmatic insights of Professor Farber). 
 327. See Figure 1, supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text (depicting factors ranging from 
the most concrete to most abstract inquiry). 
 328. See supra Part IV.B (discussing seventeen key pragmatic principles). 
